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Chapter 2 
Reliability Analysis 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Going back in history, in order to understand how man gradually conquered 
enough “certainties” to accept rationally the risk of his uncertainties, the first 
that established rules governing the acceptance of risk in construction is 
certainly Hammurabi with his code [1]. This Babylonian sovereign (circa 
1755B.C.)  put together a set of prescriptions, dictated by the gods, constituting 
the first, so complete and organic, legal code ever known. It remain in force in 
Mesopotamia for a thousand years. The code related to construction of houses, 
and the mason’s responsibility was strongly binding [2].  
 
 Article 229: If a mason has constructed a house for someone but has 
not strengthened his construction, and if the house that he has 
constructed collapses and kills the house owner, that mason shall be 
put to death. 
Article 230: If it is the child of the house owner that has been killed, 
one of the mason’s children shall be put to death. 
 
It is interesting to note that the insistence on safety was then based on the 
transfer onto the builder of a risk that related to his own security: linking the 
notion of risk to the outcome of the feared event remains quite a contemporary 
mindset. In fact, risk is defined by the existence of a feared event that has a 
probability (or possibility) of occurrence, and by the gravity of the 
consequences of this event [3]. 
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Figure 2.0: Hammurabi’ s Code ca. 1755 B.C. 
 
After more than 3,5 millenniums engineers still fight with uncertainties. Now a 
days with different nature from the Hammurabi’s one, but sometimes very close 
and similar. Obviously according to the random nature of all the parameters 
that are involved in a design problem, uncertainties will be never entirely 
eliminated and must be taken into account, using probabilistic and statistical 
analysis, when designing any civil structure.  
Depending on the nature of a structure, environmental conditions and applied 
actions, some types of uncertainties may become critical. The following types of 
uncertainties can usually be identified, approximately corresponding to the 
decreasing amount of current knowledge and available theoretical tools to 
analyze them and to take them into account in design [4]: 
• Natural randomness of actions, materials properties and geometric data; 
• Statistical uncertainties due to limited size of available data; 
• Uncertainties of theoretical models caused by a simplification of actual 
conditions; 
• Vagueness due to inaccurate definition of performance requirements; 
4 
 
• Gross errors in design, execution and operation of structure; 
• Lack of knowledge of the behavior of new materials in real conditions. 
The uncertainties listed above may be relatively well described by available 
methods of the theory of probability and mathematical statistics. The current 
European code, the Eurocode [5] and the international Standard [6] provide 
some guidance to how to proceed. 
Several design methods and operational techniques have been proposed and 
worldwide used to control the unfavorable effect of various uncertainties during 
a specified working life time. Simultaneously the theory of structural reliability 
has been developed to describe and analyze the above mentioned uncertainties 
in a rational way and to take them into account in design and verification of 
structural performance. In fact the development of the whole theory was 
initiated to be observed with insufficiencies and structural failures caused by 
various uncertainties. 
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2.2 Basic Concepts 
2.2.1 Reliability 
“Is this reliable, is it safe”? 
How many times have we heard this question? This is a common question that 
everyone has set more than once in his life. The concept of reliability, in general, 
is often used with in an absolute way; in civil structures this is even more 
pronounced by the fact that the life of people is involved. A structure, form the 
point of view of a normal person, is or is not reliable. The first case means that is 
expected that the failure of the structure will never occur, obviously an 
impossible scenario, that will be one of the central points of this thesis work, 
and the second, usually better interpreted, means that failures are expected and 
the probability or frequency of their occurrence is then discussed. 
This simplified interpretation of the terms is incorrect. It is easy to understand 
that it is impossible to design a structure that will never fail with any kind and 
intensity of actions, but it is difficult to accept that the “absolute reliability” does 
not exist. In the design it is necessary to accept that the failure may occur in 
small probability within the intended life of the structure. Otherwise it would 
not be possible at all to design civil structures. 
There are a lot of different definitions in literature of the term “reliability”. From 
a mathematical point of view Reliability is defined as 
  = 1 −  (2.0) 
Where R is the reliability and Pf is the probability of failure of a certain event. 
The ISO 2394 [6] provides a definition that contains in few words the main 
mining and gives a clear explanation of the concept: “reliability is the ability of a 
structure to comply with given requirements under specified conditions during 
the intended life, for which it was designed”. In Eurocode [5] no definition is 
offered and it is only noted that reliability covers the load-bearing capacity, 
serviceability as well as the durability of a structure. In the fundamentals 
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requirements it is then stated that “a structure shall be designed and executed 
in such a way that it will, during its intended life with appropriate degrees of 
reliability and in an economic way, remain fit for the use for which it is required 
and sustain all actions and influences likely to occur during execution and use.” 
Note that in the EC [5] the probability of failure Pf and the reliability index β are 
related to failure consequences. 
The terms mentioned in the [6] are related to quantities described, defined and 
quantified in the code [5]: 
• Given (performance) requirements – the definition of the structural 
failure; 
• Time period – the assessment of the required service-life T; 
• Reliability level – the assessment of the probability of failure Pf; 
• Conditions of use – limiting input uncertainties. 
It is necessary to reach an accurate specification of the term failure. When 
requirement for stabilities and collapse of structure are considered it is not very 
difficult to specify the term. But in other cases when dealing with occupants’ 
comfort, appearance and characteristic of the environment, the appropriate 
definitions of failure are dependent on vagueness’s and inaccuracies. The 
transformation of these occupants’ requirements into appropriate technical 
quantities and precise criteria is very hard and often leads to considerably 
vague conditions. 
To verify all the aspects of structural reliability implied by the above mentioned 
basic requirements, an appropriate design lifetime, design situations and limit 
states should be considered.  
 
2.2.2 Design methods 
During the twentieth century, three main empirical design methods have been 
used. These methods are still applied in standards of the national codes. These 
important methods are listed below: 
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• Permissible stresses method; 
• Global factor method; 
• Partial factor method. 
A brief description of these fundamental design method will be given below in 
the next paragraphs. 
 
2.2.3 Permissible stresses method  
The most used design method of the twentieth century is the permissible 
stresses, based on linear elasticity theory. His basic design conditions is: 
 σmax< σper (2.1) 
where σper = σcrit / k denotes the permissible stress and the coefficient k  
(greater than 1) is the only explicit measure supposed to take into account all 
types of uncertainties. This method, so common ad used, is very friendly 
because it is simple, designers can understand the design procedure as it is very 
immediate. It is a local effect (stresses) verification method. No proper way is 
provided for treating geometric non-linearity, stress distribution and ductility of 
structural materials and members. All these facts has the obvious consequence 
that it  usually leads to an conservative and uneconomical design. Moreover, the 
main insufficiency of the permissible stresses method is lake of possibility to 
consider uncertainties of individual basic variables and computational models 
used to assess load effect and structural resistances. 
 
2.2.4 Global safety factor method 
The second widespread method of structural design is the method of global 
safety factor. Essentially it is based on a condition relating the standard or 
nominal values of the structural resistance R and load effect E. it may be written 
as: 
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 	 = 			
	 	> 	  (2.2) 
the calculated safety factor s must be greater than its specified value γ0 (for 
exemplum γ0=1.9 is commonly required for bending resistance of reinforced 
concrete members). 
The global safety factor method attempts to take into account realistic 
assumptions concerning structural behavior of members and their cross-
sections, geometric nonlinearity, stress distribution and ductility, all 
phenomena not taken into account by the permissible stresses method; 
however the main insufficiency of this method remains a lack of possibility to 
consider the uncertainties of particular basic quantities and theoretical models. 
  
2.2.5 Partial factor method 
So far the most advanced operational method of structural design, accepted by 
[5 and 6], is the partial factor method usually applied in conjunction with the 
concept of limit states. The inequity that characterize the method is: 
 
	, , ,  < 		, , ,  (2.3) 
where the design values of action Ed and structural resistance Rd are assessed 
considering the design values of basic variables describing the actions                  
Fd = ψγFFk, material properties fd = fk/γm, dimensions ad+Δa and model 
uncertainties θd. The design values of these quantities are determined using 
their characteristic values, partial factors γ, reduction factors ψ and other 
measures of reliability. The whole system of partial factors and other reliability 
elements may be used to control the level of structural reliability. Compared 
with previous design methods the partial factor format obviously offers the 
greatest possibility to harmonize reliability of various types of structures made 
of different materials. Note, however, that in any of the above listed design 
methods the failure probability is not applied directly. Consequently, the failure 
probability of different structures made of different materials may still 
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considerably vary even though sophisticated calibration procedures were 
applied. Further desired calibrations of reliability elements on probabilistic 
bases are needed. 
  
2.2.6 Probabilistic methods 
In any of the described methods the probability of failure is applied directly. 
Among standards for structural design the document ISO [6] was the first one to 
include probabilistic methods. 
The probabilistic design is based on the condition that the probability of failure 
Pf does not exceed during the service life of a structure Td a specified target 
value Pt 
 	 ≤  (2.4) 
or the reliability index β is greater than its design value βd 
  >  (2.5) 
Pf and β are related with the following relation: 
  = Φ− (2.6) 
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standardized Normal 
distribution. The relation between Φ and β is given in table 2.1 [5]. 
 
Pf 10-1 10-2 10-3 10-4 10-5 10-6 10-7 
β 1.28 2.32 3.09 3.72 4.27 4.75 5.20 
Table 2.1 – Table C1 Relation between β and Pf,  Eurocode 1990 [5] 
 
In general greater β values should be used when a short reference period (1 o 5 
years) will be used for verification of structural reliability.  
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2.2.7 Principles of limit state design 
The fundamental case of the theory of structural reliability is the analysis of a 
simple requirement that the action effect E (expressed in a suitable unit) is 
smaller than the structural resistance R. The condition is expressed  in 
inequality (22.7). 
 
 <  (2.7) 
The condition (2.7) describes a desirable state of a considered structural 
component. It is assumed that structural failure occurs when the condition is 
not satisfied. Thus, an assumed sharp distinction between a desirable and 
undesirable state of the structure is given by the equality 
  − 
 = 0 (2.8) 
Equation (2.8) is the fundamental form of the so-called limit state function. It 
should be note, however, that the assumption of a sharp boundary between 
desirable and undesirable states is a simplification that might not be suitable for 
all structural members and materials. 
Both the variables E and R are generally random variables and the validity of 
inequality (2.7) cannot be guaranteed absolutely. Therefore, it is necessary to 
accept the fact that the limit state described by equation (2.8) may be exceeded 
and failure may occur with a certain probability. The essential objective of 
reliability theory is to assess the probability of failure Pf and to find the 
necessary conditions for its limited magnitude. For the simple condition in the 
form of inequality (2.7) the probability of failure may be formally written as 
  = 
 >  (2.9) 
The random character of the action effect E and the resistance R, both expressed 
in terms of a suitable variable X is usually described by an appropriate 
distribution function, for example ΦE(x), ΦR(x) and by the corresponding 
probability density functions φE(x) and φR(x) where x denotes a general point of 
the considered variable X used to express both the variables E and R. 
11 
 
Assuming to have both E and R random variables, as usually in reality. And 
assuming first that the both variables are described by a normal distribution, so 
also the difference (2.10) called, reliability margin, has a normal distribution 
with parameters μG, σG2 (2.11, 2.12) 
  =  − 
 (2.10) 
  =  −   (2.11) 
 !" = !" + ! " + 2% !"! " (2.12) 
where ρRE denotes the coefficient of correlation of R and E. If R and E are 
mutually independent the coefficient of correlation is ρRE =0.  
Defining  
 &' = !''  (2.13) 
As introduced in (1.6) the probability of failure is 
  = Φ(−'!') (2.14) 
Where Φ is the standardized normal distribution function. The point of failure is * = 0. 
the equation of Pf (2.9) can now be modified in (2.13) 
  = P
 >  = P < 0 = Φ'0 (2.15) 
and the whole problem is reduced to determine the distribution function ΦG(0), 
which gives the probabilities of the reliability margin G being negative. The 
relation that there is between 	and	 is (2.6) or can be  
  = −Φ/0 (2.16) 
Where −Φ/0 denotes the inverse distribution function of a standardized 
normal distribution. As its numerical values are more suitable than the values of 
the failure probability, the reliability index β defined in (2.16) is commonly used 
as measure of structural reliability. 
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The distribution function ΦG(0) is usually determined using the transformation 
of the variable G into the standardized random variable U from tables. Using this 
equation, the value u0 corresponding to the value G=0 is given as 
 1 = 0 − ! = −! (2.17) 
Thus the probability of failure is given as 
  = P < 
 = Φ0 = Φ21 (2.18) 
The probability density function ΦG(g) of the reliability margin G is shown in 
figure 2.1, where the grey area under the curve ΦG(g) corresponds to the failure 
probability Pf. 
Assuming that G has the normal distribution the value –u0 is called the reliability 
index, which is commonly denoted by the symbol β. In case of normal 
distribution of the reliability margin G, it follows form equations (2.11), (2.12) 
and (2.14) that the reliability index β is given by simple relationship 
  = ! =  −  3!" + !" + 2% !"!" (2.19) 
 
As previously was said if R and E are mutually independent, the coefficient of 
correlation ρRE=0. Thus the reliability index is the distance of the mean μG of the 
reliability margin function G from the origin, given in the units of the standard 
deviation σG (fig 2.1). 
 
13 
 
 
Figure  2.1: Limit state function and probability of failure Pf in a two dimensional case [17]. 
 
In case that the variables E and R are not normal distributed, then the 
distribution of the reliability margin G is not normal either and then the above 
described procedure has to be modified. One way that can be used, as usually 
software products do, is the numerical integration or transformation of both 
variables into variables with normal distribution. 
There is, however and approximate simple procedure that can provide a good 
first assessment of the failure probability Pf. The reliability margin G may be 
approximates by three-parameter log-normal distribution. The mean and the 
variance of the reliability margin G may be assisted by the previous equations 
(2.11) and (2.12), which hold for variables with an arbitrary distribution. 
Assuming mutual independence of E and R, the skewness αG  of the reliability 
margin G may be estimated using the following approximate relation                
 4 = !5! − !65! !" + !6"5 "7  (2.20) 
Then it is assumed that the reliability margin G can be described with sufficient 
accuracy by log-normal distribution with determined moment parameters μG, 
σG, and αG. this approximation offers satisfactory results if the probability of 
failure is not too small [8]. 
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The above descriptions is made for the case of normal distribution for both the 
quantities R and E. In the next paragraphs the case of general distribution for R 
and E is described.  
In this case the exact solution of the probability of failure Pf  may be obtained by 
integration.  Supposing that an event A denote the occurrence of an action effect 
E in the differential interval <x, x+dx> the probability of occurrence of event A is 
given as 
 P8 = P9 < 
 < 9 + :9 = ; 9:9 (2.21) 
Denoting B as the event that resistance R occurs within the interval <-∞,x>. 
Probability of event B is given by the relation 
 P< = P < 9 = Φ9 (2.22) 
The differential increment of the probability of failure dPf , corresponding to the 
occurrence of the variable E in the interval <x, x+dx>, is given by the probability 
of simultaneous occurrence of the events A and B using the principle of 
multiplication of probabilities 
 d = P8 ∩ < = P8P< = P9 < 
 < 9 + d9P < 9= φ 9Φ?xd9 (2.23) 
The integration of the differential relationship over the interval in which both 
the variables E and R occur simultaneously (generally <-∞,∞>) leads to the 
relation 
  = A ; 9Φ9d9B/B  (2.24) 
This integral can be solved or numerically or using the simulation of Monte 
Carlo. 
The determination of failure probability in case of two random variable is 
simple only when both the variables are normally distributed. If they have other 
distributions  the exact solution is more complicated and the resulting values 
depend significantly on the assumed type of distributions. The approximate 
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solution assuming for E and R, a general, three parameter, log-normal 
distribution provides a good first estimate failure probability. The obtained 
values should be verified by more exact procedures considering appropriate 
theoretical models of E and R. 
 
2.2.8 Design Points in Eurocode 
For the design of a structure is obviously necessary to have a design point. In 
case of probabilistic design the design point is defined only by probabilistic 
aspects. This paragraph will give a brief information about the Eurocodes [5] 
definition of the design point necessary for the design purposes. Figure 2.2 
shows in a two-dimensional graph the basic variables R and E with the limit 
state function (2.8).  
On the horizontal axis there it the quantity R/σR, and on the vertical axis the 
ratio E/σE. It is assumed that both the variables are independent and normally 
distributed. The joint probability distribution function can be represented by a 
concentric circus corresponding to different levels of the probability density. In 
case that the variables are not normally distributed it is possible to transform 
them at a given point into normal distributed variables. 
 
The safe region where condition (2.7) is satisfied is located under the failure 
boundary (the diagonal of the axes), the failure region lies above the diagonal. 
All the points lying on the failure boundary are hypothetic design points. How 
previously explained the best point is the one on the limit state function closer 
to the mean. Thus the design points coordinates are 
 C =  − 4 !  (2.25) 
 D =  − 4! (2.26) 
where αE and αR are the FORM sensitivity factors respectively of E and R. The 
use of “minus” in equations (2.25) and (2.26) is in agreement with the 
convention provided for the sensitivity factors in Eurocode [5]. 
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Figure 2.2: Mathematical representation of design point [8]. 
 
The sensitivity factors have so this expressions considering the “minus 
convention” of equation (2.25) and (2.26). 
 
 4 = − ! 3! " + !" (2.27) 
 4 = !3! " + !" (2.28) 
the Eurocodes suggest an approximation of these factors with fixed values  
 4 = −0,7 (2.29) 
 4 = 0,8 (2.30) 
these values are valid if the following condition is satisfied [5] 
 0,16 < ! ! < 7,6 (2.31) 
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In case that this condition is not satisfied the Eurocodes recommend as 
sensitivity factors α=±1,0. Holický M. et all, in [8]  remark that this is a 
simplification on the safe side as the sum of squared direction cosines, which 
should be equal to one.  
The design value are, thus, defined as the fractile of the normal distribution   
 P
 > C = Φ2+4  = Φ2−0,7 (2.32) 
 P < D = Φ2−4 = Φ2−0,8 (2.33) 
where ΦU (u) denotes a standardized distribution function of normal 
distribution. Expressions (2.32) and (2.33) are used for dominating variables, in 
case of other, non-dominating, variables the requirements on the design values 
are decreased by taking in account the 40% of the reliability index β 
 P
 > C = Φ2+0,44  = Φ2−0,28 (2.34) 
 P < D = Φ2−0,44 = Φ2−0,32 (2.35) 
The design values ed and rd are the upper fractiles (for actions) and the lower 
fractiles (for resistances), corresponding to certain probabilities of being 
exceeded or not reached. For the dominant variables, the probabilities are given 
by the distribution function of the normal standardized distribution for values 
u=+αEβ and –αRβ, or in case of non-dominant variables for reduced values 
u=+0,4αEβ and –0,4αRβ. These probabilities are then used to determinate the 
design values of the basic variables having an arbitrary type of distribution. The 
expressions provided in table 2.2 should be used for deriving the design values 
of variables with the given probability distribution. 
Distribution Design Values 
Normal  − 4! 
Log- normal exp	−4& 
Gumbel  − 0.577 − !√6O lnQ− ln−4R 
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Table 2.2: Expressions for deriving design values for different 
probability distributions [5]. 
Where μ, σ and V are, respectively, the mean value, the standard deviation and 
the coefficient of variation of a given variable. For variable actions, these should 
be based on the same reference period as β. 
 
2.2.9 Multivariate Case 
In previous section the basic case of two random variables and a linear 
performance function have been considered. Usually more than two variables 
are considered during a probabilistic design analysis. The different considered 
variables X1, X2, … , Xn are denoted as the vector X=[ X1, X2, … , Xn] and their 
realization x1, x2, … , xn as the vector x= [x1, x2, … , xn]. in the multivariate case the 
reliability margin (2.10) may be generalized as 
 S0, 	S", … , SU = V (2.36) 
The safe domain of the basic variables is described by the inequality 
 S0, 	S", … , SU = V > 0 (2.37) 
The unsafe domain of the basic variables is described by the inequality 
 S0, 	S", … , SU = V < 0 (2.38) 
The limit state function is thus given as 
 S0, 	S", … , SU = V = 0 (2.39) 
When a non-linear performance function G(X) and more basic variables X are 
considered, failure probabilities Pf can be generally expressed using the limit 
state function G(X) as 
  = V ≤ 0 = A ;VdV'VW  (2.40) 
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Where φ(X) is the joint probability function of the vector of all the basic 
variables X. this function may be difficult to find and complicated to solve. The 
integral can be also written as a multiple integral 
 = V ≤ 0 = A ;X090;X"9"…;XU9Ud90d9"…d9U'VW  (2.41) 
In some case this integration can be done analytically, in some other cases, 
when the number of basic variables is small (up to 5) various types of numerical 
integration may be effectively applied [8].  
In general the failure probability may be computed using [6] 
• Exact analytical integration; 
• Numerical methods; 
• Approximate analytical methods (FROM, SORM ect.); 
• Simulation methods; 
• Combination of the previously listed methods. 
Exact analytical method can be applied only in exceptional academic cases. 
Numerical integration can be applied much more frequently. The most popular 
computational procedure to determinate the failure probability constitute 
approximate analytical methods. In complicated cases simulations methods or 
their combination with approximate analytical methods are commonly applied. 
  
2.2.10 FORM and SORM 
The First and the Second Order Reliability Method (FORM and SORM) are the 
basic and very efficient reliability methods. This methods are usually used by 
software products for the reliability analysis of structures and systems [4]. The 
Eurocodes EN 1990 [5] explains that the design values are based on FORM 
reliability method. 
FORM in an analytical approximation in which the reliability index is 
interpreted as the minimum distance from the origin to the limit state surface in 
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standardized normal space (u-space) and the most likely failure point (design 
point) is searched using mathematical programming methods [9 and 10]. 
Because  the performance function is approximated by a linear function in u-
space at the design point, accuracy problems occur when the performance 
function is strongly nonlinear [11 and 12].  
The SORM has been established as an attempt to improve the accuracy of FORM 
by approximating the limit state surface in u-space at the design point by a 
second-order surface. In SORM the difficult, time consuming portion is the 
computation of the matrix of second order derivatives, i.e. the Hessian matrix. 
To address this problem, an efficient point-fitting algorithm [13 and14] is 
derived, in which the major principal axis of the limit state surface and the 
corresponding curvature are obtained in the course of obtaining the design 
point without computing the Hessian matrix; and an alternative point-fitting 
SORM was developed [15], in which the performance function is directly point 
fitted using a general form of second-order polynomial of standard normal 
random variables. An important point of these method is to understand the 
applicable range of FORM. The problem of its accuracy has been examined by 
many studies trough a large number of examples. Some method are proposed 
[16] to judge whether the results of FORM are accurate enough or not, and when 
SORM or more accurate method should be used. 
Considering a multivariate case when basic variables are described by a vector 
X[X1, X2,…, Xn], the main steps of the FORM method can be summarized as 
follows: 
• The basic variables X are transformed into space of standardized normal 
variables U, and the performance function G(X)=0 transformed into 
G’(U)=0 (fig. 1.3); 
• The failure surface G’(X)= 0 is approximated at a chosen given point by a 
tangent hyper plane (using Taylor expansion); 
• The design point, i.e. the point of the surface G’(U)=0 closest to the origin, 
is found by iteration (fig. 2.3); 
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• The reliability index β is determined as the distance of the design point 
from the origin (fig 2.3) and then the failure probability Pf is given as 
Pf=Φ(-β). 
 
Figure 2.3: The First Order Reliability Method, FORM [8]. 
The first step transformation of the original variable X into a space of 
standardized normal variables U is illustrated in figure 2.3-a showing the 
original basic variables R and E and figure 2.3-b showing the transformed 
variables UR and UE. the transformation to the equivalent normal variables at a 
given point x* is based on two conditions: 
• Equal distribution functions 
 ΦY9∗ = Φ2 [9∗ − X\!X\ ]	; (2.42) 
• Equal probability increments 
 φY9∗ = 0_a` φ2 bc∗/da`_a` e ; (2.43) 
The mean and the standard deviation of the equivalent normal distribution 
follow from equations (2.36) and (2.37) 
 X\ = 9∗ − !X\fΦg/0hΦY9∗ij (2.44) 
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 !X\ = 0klc∗φ2 mc∗/da`_a` n = 0klc∗φ2fΦg/0hΦY9∗ij ; (2.45) 
The whole computation iteration procedure of the FORM method can be 
summarized in the following ten steps: 
1. The limit state function G(X)=0 is formulated and theoretical models of 
basic variables X = {X1, X2, … , Xn} are specified; 
2. The initial assessment of the design point x*={x1*, x2*, … , xn*} is made; for 
example by the mean values of n-1 basic variables and the last one is 
determined from the limit state function G(x*)=0; 
3. At the point x*={x1*, x2*, … , xn*} equivalent normal distributions are found 
for all the basic variables using equations (2.37) and (2.38); 
4. The transformed design point u*={u1*, u2*, … , un*} of the standardized 
random variables U= {U1, U2, … , Un} corresponding to the design point 
x*={x1*, x2*, … , xn*} is determined using equation 
 1o∗ = 9o∗ − Xp\!Xp\ 	 ; (2.46) 
5. Partial derivatives denoted as a vector D of the limit state function with 
respect to the standardized variables U={U1, U2, … , Un} are evaluated at 
the design point  
 q = rs0s"⋮sUu 	where		so =
y'zgp=y'zYp yXpzgp = y'zYp !Xp\  (2.47) 
For a linear limit state function  + ∑oSo = 0 the derivatives are so = o; 
6. The reliability index is estimated as  
  = − |s}~|1∗}3|s}~|s} 	where			|1∗} = 
10∗1"∗⋮1U∗ (2.48) 
For linear limit stat function  + ∑oSo = 0 the reliability index is given 
as  
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  =  + ∑oXp\∑ho!Xp\ i" 	 ; (2.49) 
7. Sensitivity factors are determined as 
 |4} = |s}3|s}~|s}	; (2.50) 
8. A new design point is determined for  − 1 standardised and original 
basic variables from 
 1o∗ = 4oo (2.51) 
 9o∗ = Xp\ − 1o∗!Xp\  ; (2.52) 
9. The design value of the remaining basic variable is determined from the 
limit state function G(x*)=0; 
10. The steps 3 to 9 are repeated until the reliability index β and the design 
point {x*} have the required accuracy. 
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2.3 Concluding Remarks 
• The theory of structural reliability and probabilistic methods of risk 
assessment are used as scientific bases of the partial factor method and 
as an alternative design method; 
• Two equivalent reliability measures are commonly used to verify 
structural reliability: the failure probability (Pf) and the reliability index 
(β); 
• Before calculating the probability of failure is it necessary to define the 
limit state G=R-E; 
• The determination of failure probability in case of two random variable 
is simple only when both the variables are normally distributed. If they 
have other distributions  the exact solution is more complicated and the 
resulting values depend significantly on the assumed type of 
distributions. The approximate solution assuming for E and R, a general, 
three parameter, log-normal distribution provides a good first estimate 
failure probability. The obtained values should be verified by more exact 
procedures considering appropriate theoretical models of E and R; 
• The design values ed and rd are the upper fractiles (for actions) and the 
lower fractiles (for resistances), corresponding to certain probabilities of 
being exceeded or not reached. For the dominant variables, the 
probabilities are given by the distribution function of the normal 
standardized distribution for values u=+αEβ and –αRβ, or in case of non-
dominant variables for reduced values u=+0,4αEβ and –0,4αRβ. These 
probabilities are then used to determinate the design values of the basic 
variables having an arbitrary type of distribution; 
• Basic method of determining failure probability or reliability index 
include analytical methods, approximate analytical methods, numerical 
integration and various simulation methods. 
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Chapter 3 
Risk Analysis Framework 
 
3.1 Introduction 
When designing a new structure or in general when approaching a new 
engineering problem (but also in general in other fields), one of the main point 
at the beginning step is the risk assessment.  
Risk assessment is the determination of quantitative or qualitative value of risk 
related to a concrete situation and a recognized threat, called hazard. For that is 
needed calculations of two components of risk: the magnitude of the potential 
loss and the probability that the loss will occur.  
Risk assessment is used for estimating the likelihood and the outcome of risks 
to human health, safety and environment on one hand, and on the other to 
enlightening decisions about how to deal with those risks.  
Any technical system is exposed to a multitude of possible hazards. In the case 
of civil engineering structures, these hazards include both, those from the 
environment (wind, temperature, snow, avalanches, rock falls, ground effects, 
water and ground water, chemical or physical attacks etc.) and those from 
human activities (usage, chemical or physical attacks, fire, explosion etc).  
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3.2 Hazard Identification 
Usually different hazards occur together in space and time. Such situation may 
lead to higher risks than those corresponding to the individual hazards. The 
scenario approach is developed into three main steps [1]: 
• Recognition of the situations with more than two hazards occur together; 
• Evaluation of the hazards and determination of the risk corresponding to 
the different scenarios; 
• Planning of preventive measures if needed. 
The first step, the qualitative identification of the hazard is the most important 
and difficult step of the approach. Indeed, once the potential hazards and 
combination of hazards are recognized, usually it is relatively simple to adopt 
appropriate measures to overcome their consequences.  
Various techniques exist that may help the engineer to recognize possible 
hazards. The common characteristic of all the techniques is that they are based 
on asking questions.  If the right questions are asked it is quite simple to identify 
all the potential hazards, but it is necessary to have imagination and creativity. 
When searching for potential hazards it is necessary to have, at the beginning 
stage of the design, a complete idea of the whole construction, use, repair 
and/or its future replacement or demolition  process. For a correct conduction 
of this aspect it is useful to have experience and to consult specialized literature. 
Different strategies of thinking with a view to identifying possible hazards and 
hazard scenarios are known under various names, for example Hazard 
Operability Study (HAZOP), What-if Analysis, Failure Mode and Effect Analysis 
(FMEA) [2]. In daily practice the goal is to recognize all possible hazards related 
to a particular problem. In order to reach this goal, a combination of different of 
these strategies, which are listed below is to be applied: 
29 
 
• In chronological analysis, the whole process, step by step, has to be 
established in mind. Typical questions to be asked are: what will occur, 
where and when? 
• In an utilization analysis question concerning the planes use of the future 
engineering facility are to be raised: what equipment or machines will be 
used? What influence do they have? What could go wrong? 
• In an influence analysis it is looked at influences from the natural 
environment and from human activities. New situations have to be 
anticipated, which could make initially harmless influences dangerous. 
Furthermore, it must be looked at individual hazards that alone would be 
negligible, but in combination become dangerous; 
• Energy analysis where and in what circumstance potential due to 
different energies could lead to a hazardous situation? The failure of an 
energy supply can also constitute a danger. 
• In material analysis it has to be looked, for example, at the durability, 
combustibility, toxicity or explosiveness of the used raw materials. 
• Examining interfaces hazards can be anticipated where different 
materials are in contact, or where information has to be transmitted, or 
where responsibilities are not clearly defined. 
The morphological thinking is a method developed in [3] and its  main point, 
above listed, are token from [1].  
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3.3 Risk Analysis Methodologies 
In this paragraph a brief description of the main risk analysis methodologies 
will be done, for a complete overview of the approach systems to the problem. 
The main point where taken from [4]. 
3.3.1 Hazard and Operability studies (HAZOP) 
The Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP) was developed in the early 1970s 
be Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. HAZOP can be defined as the application of 
a formal systematic critical examination of the process and engineering 
intentions of new or existing facilities. 
This technique is usually performed using a set of guidewords: NO/NOT, 
MORE/LESS OF, AS WELL AS, PART OF REVERSE, AND OTER THAN. Form these 
guidewords scenarios that may result in a hazard or an operational problem are 
identified. Consider the possible flow problems in a process line, the  guide 
word MORE OF will correspond to high flow rate, while that for LESS THAN, low 
flow rate. The consequences of the hazard and measures to reduce the 
frequency with which the hazard will occur are then discussed. This technique 
had gained wide acceptance in process industries as an effective tool for plant 
safety and operability improvements. 
 
3.3.2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA/ FMECA) 
This method was developed in the 1950s by reliability engineers to determinate 
problems that could arise from malfunctions of military systems. Failure mode 
and effects analysis is a procedure by which each potential failure mode in a 
system is analyzed to determine its effects on the system and to classify it 
according to its severity. 
When the FMEA is extended by a criticality analysis, the technique is then called 
Failure Mode and Effects Critically Analysis (FMECA). Failure mode and effects 
analysis has gained wide acceptance by the aerospace and military  industries. 
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In fact, the technique has adapted itself in other form such as measure mode and 
effects analysis. 
3.3.3 Tree based Techniques 
In order to introduce some clarity and completeness in the engineering work, 
logic trees (fault tree, event tree, cause-consequent chart) are used in risk 
analysis. The use of this kind of tool is very widespread in risk analysis and 
implies some important advantages. Influence from the environment and from 
human activities can easily be considered simultaneously. Logic trees also can 
contribute to detect the most effective countermeasures. Furthermore, they are 
easy to understand and therefor very helpful for communication purposes with 
non-experts. 
Fault Trees Analysis 
The concept of fault tree analysis (FTA) was originated by “Bell Telephone 
Laboratories” in 1962 as a technique with which to perform a safety evaluation 
of the Minutemen Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Launch Control System. A 
fault tree can be defined as a logical diagram for the representation of 
combinations of influences that can lead to an undesired event. When 
establishing a fault tree, the undesired event constitutes the starting point. 
Going out from this event the possible causes are to be identified. Possible 
causes and consequences are to be linked, in a logic way, without introducing 
any loops. Every event that is not a consequence of a previous event has to be 
considered as an independent variable [5]. 
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Figure 3.1: Fault tree example construction. 
 
After a failure event, fault trees can be used in order to clarify the cause in case 
that they should be unknown. The most common application, however, consists 
in detecting possible causes of undesirable events before they can occur. 
Once the qualitative point of view is described, the calculation of the probability 
of occurrence of the undesirable top event should be performed. For fault trees 
the probabilities have to be calculated depending on the type of the logic gate. If 
the different components must fail at the same time (the first and the second 
and…), they constitute a parallel system represented by an AND-Gate. 
Therefore, the corresponding probability is obtained according to the 
multiplications rule, by multiplying the probabilities of the different 
components. On the other hand, if only one component must fail (either the first, 
or the second, or…), they represent a series system. In that case we are talking 
about as OR-Gate and the probability of failure is obtained by adding the 
probabilities of the different components [4]. 
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Event Tree Analysis 
Starting from an initial event, an event tree, identifies all the possible 
consequences events. Each path consists of a sequence of events and ends up at 
the consequence level as shown by figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.2: Example of an event tree for a rock fall on railway-line [1]. 
 
The aim is the establishment of possible consequences of an initial event. In a 
second step the event tree also can be used for the calculation of probabilities of 
occurrence of these consequences.  
Once the qualitative point of view is described, the calculation of the probability 
of occurrence of the consequences of a given initiation event should be 
performed. For event tree as showed above the possible subsequence events 
following a previous event exclude each other. The sum of the probabilities at a 
gate of an event tree must be the unity. The calculation of the probability of 
occurrence of a consequence is very simple since it is obtained by multiplying 
the probabilities of the different events constituting the path that leads to the 
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considered consequence. The main difficult point is the establishment of the 
probabilities of the different events, and very often numerical values are based 
on subjective estimations [4]. 
 
Cause/Consequence Analysis 
The two previous analysis methods can be combined to obtain a 
Cause/Consequences Analysis (CCA). This technique combines cause analysis, 
described by fault trees, with consequence analysis, described by event trees, 
and thus deductive and inductive analysis. The questions are formulated in a 
way that the answer only can be “yes” or “no”. In this way a very compact 
representation of complex problems can be obtained.  
With the probability of the various events in the CCA diagram, the probabilities 
of the various consequences can be calculated, thus establishing the risk level of 
the system[4]. 
 
3.3.3 Example of Decision analysis 
As previously mentioned one of the basis of engineering problems is the 
decision analysis. An engineer when approaching a situation has to decide if to 
change or not a specific system and in the affirmative case how to change it. The 
previous paragraphs have introduced the basic tolls available for doing such 
analysis. 
To have a more clear understanding of the problem a brief and very easy 
example is proposed.  In this example according to the fact that the decision 
analysis will be analyzed all used quantities are deterministic. 
The investigated problem refers to a design situation where a beam of a truss is 
analyzed. The beam is subjected to a compression force. The designer have to 
decide if to keep the existing beam (a) or substitute the beam with a one with a 
larger area A1 (b) or with an area A2>A1. 
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Supposing that in the first event (a) the probability of failure is 1,2 10-2; that in 
the second case (b) we want to reach, for a certain reason, with the new beam 
(with area A1) a probability of failure of 10-3, and in the third case (c) a 
probability of failure of 10-4, with the A2 area. 
Analyzing the consequences of the failure of the truss structure the designer 
evaluate the collapse consequences in a monetary quantity, 1 000 000,00 € (10-
6) of course, the same, for all the scenarios (a), (b) and (c).  
Analyzing the different cost of realization of the different situations the designer 
evaluate that situation (a) has a realization cost of 0.00€ according to the fact 
that nothing changes. Situation (b) has a realization costs of 10 000,00€ and 
situation (c) 13 000,00€. The small difference between the costs of situation (b) 
and (c) is due only to material costs, all other costs, demolition, disposal and 
reconstructions are the same. 
All the previous information are summarized in table 3.1 and in figure 3.3. 
 
Scenario Probability of failure Scenario cost 
(€) 
Collapse consequences 
(€) 
a 1,2 10-2 0,00 1 000 000,00 
b 10-3 10 000,00 1 000 000,00 
c 10-4 13 000,00 1 000 000,00 
Table 3.1: Data of the Example for the decision analysis of a beam of a truss structure 
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Figure 3.3: Event tree that shows the initial condition of the example proposed in this 
paragraph. Analysis of a beam of the truss subjected to compression strength. 
 
At this point the designer have to decide which of the three option is the best 
choice for his situation. 
As introduced in the  event tree paragraph the probability has to be calculated 
multiplying the various scenarios described in the scheme. The Expected costs 
are calculated in the following way: 
 
Q:R = 	:	: + 0:	0: 						= 1 − 1,2	10/"	0.00 + 1,2	10/"10 = 12000 (3.1) 
 
Q:0R = 	:0	:0, 	0:0	0:0= 1 − 10/510000 + 10/51010000 = 11000 (3.2) 
 
Q:"R = 	:"	:", 	0:"	0:"= 1 − 10/13000 + 10/1013000 = 13100 (3.3) 
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So the situation that the designer have analyzed is the following 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Final event tree of the example, the consequences of each choice are shown. 
 
From the final event tree the expected costs are shown (FIG 3.4). It is seen that 
decision d1 yields the largest expected utility (smallest cost) and so the decision 
that implies changing the beam with a new one having area A1 is the ‘optimal 
decision’. 
3.4 Risk Formulation 
The risk combined with an hazard is a combination of the probability of 
occurrence of this hazard and the consequences in case that it occurs, how 
mentioned in the introduction paragraph of this chapter. Therefore the most 
sophisticated methods for risk analysis take all consequences of a failure 
directly into account. The basic relation for this kind of risk calculation can be 
represented as  
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  = AS0, S", … , S		… S0, S", … , SdS0dS"… 	dS (3.4) 
Where R is the risk, C is the consequences and f  is the joint probability density 
function of the basic random variables. This integral is difficult to solve. 
Therefore, the simplest function relating the two constituents of risk is often use 
by multiplying the probability of failure, Pf by the consequences C: 
  = 	 (3.5) 
The consequences may be expressed in monetary units or in terms of injured or 
dead per event, or by some other indicator. Since fixed deterministic values are 
used for considering the consequence of a possible failure, the application of 
equation (3.5) is formally very simple. As in all this kind of studies, the main 
problem is the adoption of reasonable quantities for the constituent of risk, 
particularly for the possible damage. But as long as the results are interpreted in 
a comparative way, extremely useful information is obtained for optimization 
problems. 
Independently on the representation of risk, difficulties exist with very small 
probabilities or frequencies of occurrence of events with very large 
consequences. In such cases the product rule is no longer applicable since, from 
a mathematical point of view, zero times infinity may take any value. For this 
and other reasons, risks have to be considered in more detail. Terms like 
acceptable risks, voluntary and involuntary risks, individual and collective risks 
or residual risk are clearly to be distinguished. It should also be observed that 
the subjective perception of risk often differs from what could be called 
objective risk. 
One of the main steps of a risk analysis is the quantification of the ‘cost of 
failure’. A systematic procedure to describe and if possible quantify 
consequences is required. In general consequences resulting from civil 
structures failure may be divided into four main categories: 
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• Human; 
• Economic; 
• Environmental;  
• Social. 
Table 3.2 present a list, certainly not exhaustive, for the purpose of undertaking 
risk assessment of major structural systems. As described above the 
consequences can be direct or indirect; note that according to the system under 
investigation the same consequence can be direct or indirect. 
It is evident that the level and sophistication of the various analysis types 
increases considerably as the range and extent of considered consequences 
widens. [6] suggests advanced structural analysis, considering a multitude of 
non-linear material and geometric effects, when a particular failure scenario 
needs to be taken beyond initial damage and member failure.  
 
Type Direct Indirect 
   
Human Injuries 
Fatalities 
Injuries  
Fatalities 
Psychological damage 
Economic Repair of initial damage 
Replacement/ repair of contents 
Rescue costs 
Clean up costs 
Replacement/ repair of structures/ contents 
Rescue costs 
Clean up costs 
Collateral damage to surroundings 
Loss of functionality/ production/ business 
Temporary relocation 
Traffic delay/management costs 
Regional economic effects 
Investigations/ compensations 
Infrastructure inter-dependency costs 
Environmental CO2 emissions 
Energy use 
Pollutant releases 
CO2 emissions 
Energy use 
Pollutant releases 
Environmental clean-up/ reversibility 
Social  Loss of reputation 
Erosion of public confidence 
Undue changes in professional practice. 
   
Table 3.2: Categorization of consequences [6]. 
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These consequences can be measured in terms of damaged, destroyed, 
expended or lost assets and utilities such as raw materials, goods, services and 
lives. They may also include intangibles, either from a practical or theoretical 
standpoint especially in the case of social consequences and long-term 
environmental influences. Where possible the consequences should be 
described in monetary units, though this is not easy to achieve, and may not be 
desirable or, indeed, universally acceptable.  
 
Example of risk calculation 
Considering that the collapse of a structure have a probability of failure of 10-3 
in a site (a) and 10-2 in  site (b). The designer has to decide where to install this 
structure. Analyzing the situation the designer computes that the economic 
loses of the failure are quantifies in 200 000,00€ in site (a)  and 150 000,00€ in 
site (b). It is assumed that all the other costs are equal in the two situation. The 
designer now can use the risk definition to decide where to install the structure. 
In table 3.2 all the data are summarized. 
 
Site Pf Failure costs 
[€] 
Risk 
(a) 10-3 200 000,00 200 
(b) 10-2 150 000,00 1500 
Table 3.3: Summarized data of the example of risk calculation 
 
Where for the calculation the basic definition of risk was used (3.3). 
As summarized in the table the Risk of scenario (a) is 200 € /year and in 
scenario (b) 1500€/year so is immediate that the designer will choose scenario 
(a). 
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3.5 Conclusions 
• HAZOP, FMEA and FMECA introduced in the firsts paragraph of this 
chapter, require only the employment of hardware familiar personnel. 
However, FMEA, tends to be more labor and intensive, as the failure of 
each individual component in the system has to be considered[4].  
• FMEA is worldwide used for the case of preliminary risk analysis, 
especially in industry, offshore analysis. On the other hand HAZOP has 
been widely used in the chemical industries for detailed failure[4]. 
• The tree based methods are mainly used to find cut-sets leading to the 
undesired events. In fact event tree and fault tree have been widely used 
to quantify the probabilities of occurrence of accidents and other 
undesired events leading to the loss of life or economic losses in 
probabilistic risk assessment[4].  
• In giving the same treatment to hardware failures and human errors in 
fault and event tree analysis, the conditions affecting human behavior 
cannot be modeled explicitly. This affects the assessed level of 
dependency between events[1]. 
• Probabilistic methods mentioned in this chapter are possibly not aimed 
at the practicing engineer for everyday use. There exist mainly two 
reasons for that. Firstly, they require a considerable knowledge about 
probability concepts and, secondly, very often there is a lack of 
information concerning the parameters of the different variables 
entering a problem, and in daily practice the time needed for gathering 
the lacking date is usually not available[1]. 
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Chapter 4 
Risk Acceptance Criteria 
4.1 Introduction 
As described in the previous chapter risk is the parameter which is a 
combination of the probability of failure and the consequences of failure. In 
general it is important to distinguish between various types of consequences of 
failure for example human loses, environmental damage and economic losses. 
Structural codes traditionally have been concerned foremost with public 
preventing loss of life or injury. European codes [1], and [2] and international 
documents [3] and [4], provide general principles and guidance for application 
of probabilistic methods to structural designs. 
The choice of a target reliability is an important first step for the calibration of 
structural design codes as well as during the probabilistic design of structures 
outside the code envelop. In this work the structure of a solar ground panel will 
be analyzed under consideration of economic optimization principles. The solar 
panels yard are fenced and controlled by remote systems. Thus there is no 
human risk in case of structural failures. This aspect can give the designer the 
possibility to do considerations on the reliability index of those structures 
combined with the fact that the structures have a working design life that is 
different from those suggested in the codes (1 ore 50 years). These aspects will 
be analyzed in this thesis work. 
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4.2 General Principles 
The concept of risk acceptance criteria is well established in many industrial 
sectors. Comparative risk thresholds are established which allow a responsible 
organization to identify activities which impose an unacceptable level of risk on 
the participating individuals or society as a whole. 
Risk acceptance can be defined by two different  methods: Implicitly or 
explicitly.  
Implicit criteria often involve safety equivalence with other industrial sectors. In 
the past this approach was very common because some industrial sectors 
developed quantitative risk criteria well before others, so there were the 
possibility to compare calculated risks with this basis. Today, with the 
introduction of very potent calculus methods, thanks to new pc power, this 
methods are used only occasionally and are surpassed by more refined 
technique.  
Explicit criteria are now applied in many industrial sectors, as they tend to 
provide either a quantitative decision tool to the regulator or a comparable 
requirement for the industry when dealing with the certification / approval of a 
particular structure or system. In particular, the following approaches can be 
identified and are analytically described in the following paragraphs. 
 
4.2.1 Human Safety Approach 
Acceptable risk levels cannot be defined in an absolute sense. Each individual 
has his own perception of acceptable risk which, when expressed in decision 
theory terms, represent their own preferences. 
In order to define what is meant be acceptable risk levels, a clarifying situation 
can be introduced by figure 4.1 [7].  
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Figure 4.1: Framework of risk acceptability [7] 
 
As shown it figure 4.1 some risks are too high to be acceptable. In this case risks 
should be reduced to a level that is As Low Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). It 
may occur that the risk has a so low level that it is not necessary to reduce it. 
It is always possible to reduce the risk of a hazardous facility. But, the 
incremental costs needed for that purpose increases as the risk become smaller.  
The founds for safety  measures must be used, of course, in such a way that a 
maximum level of safety is achieved. The optimal allocation of founds is a 
classical optimization problem.  
 
4.2.2 individual Risk 
Existing statistics about human fatality risk give guidance to set individual risk 
(probability of a person being killed per year). The average death rate from 
accidents and other adverse effects including fire and structural failure at work 
and at home ranges from 10-4 per year to more than 5 10-4 per year whit long 
term tendency to smaller values.  
The acceptability of the risk from the individual point of view depends on the 
type of the activity, for example if the activity is voluntary or not. In the case of 
this study no fatality are expected with the failure of the structure. To have 
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more information about the argument there are many scientific papers as [5], 
[6]. 
 
4.2.3  Societal Risk 
To society as a whole or to a company or institution responsible for a specific 
activity, the total damage due to hazard is of prime interest as shown in the 
previous chapter. To comprehend this point of view the notion of collective risk 
R  is introduced 
  =ooUo0  (4.1) 
Where n is the number of all independent and mutually exclusive accident 
scenarios i, pi is the probability of occurrence (per year) of scenario i and Ci are 
the consequences of scenario i. These consequences may for instance be 
measured in fatalities per year, monetary units or emission of a given substance.  
Expressing the problem from a probabilistic point of view, using the probability 
of failure Pf of a progressive collapse due to an abnormal event, E as introduced 
by [8] 
  = F|LEL|EE <  (4.2) 
Where  
Pf is the probability of global failure associated to structural collapse; 
P(F|LE) is the probability  of collapse given that E and L both occur; 
P(L|E) is the probability of local damage L, given that E occurs; 
P(E) is the probability of occurrence of hazard E (accidental action); 
PA Is the Acceptable probability of global failure. 
 
The global failure F need not to be the complete collapse of a building or a 
structure as noted in [8], but can be a partial collapse greater than a considered 
limit such as the “100m2 or 15% floor area” criterion of the Eurocode [2]. 
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To consider the risk the following formulation is given [8] 
  = 	F <  (4.3) 
Where 
R is the risk;  
C(F) Is the expected consequences of global or partial failure;  
RA Is the acceptable risk; 
 
The parameters of these expression have to be evaluated basing on the 
literature information’s and personal experience. 
  In most practical studies the societal risk of an installation is given in the form 
of a numerical F-N curve [6]. In these diagrams N represents the number of 
fatalities and F the frequency of accidents with more than N fatalities. The 
curves show the relationship between the annual frequency F of accidents with 
N or more fatalities. Usually these curves are shown in a log-log plot with the 
frequency F in the ordinate axis (fig. 4.2). The recommendations of the F-N 
Curve can be represented in a so-called risk-acceptability matrix.  
For this purpose qualitative hazard probability levels have been define for 
example in [6] for road safety applications (Tab 4.1). And Hazard severity levels 
of accidental consequences in table 4.2. 
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Figure 4.2: F-N Curve, Example case from [6]. 
 
Class Frequency Range (Event per year) 
A Frequent >10 
B Occasional 1 - 10 
C Remote 0,1 - 1 
D Improbable 0,01 – 0,1 
E Incredible 0,00. – 0,01 
Table 4.1: Hazard probability levels proposed in [6] for road safety applications. 
 
Class Severity Category Human Losses 
1 Insignificant - 
2 Marginal Injuries only 
3 Critical 1 
4 Severe 10 
5 Catastrophic 100 
Table 4.2: Hazard severity levels proposed in [6] for road safety applications. 
49 
 
The hazard probability levels and the hazard severity levels can be combined to 
generate a risk classification matrix. The principle of the risk classification 
matrix is shown in table 4.3. The authority is usually responsible for defining 
the tolerability of the risk combinations contained within the risk classification 
matrix. This procedure can be seen as a different method for the same purpose 
of the F-N curve.  
 
Class 1 2 3 4 5 
A ALARP NAL NAL NAL NAL 
B ALARP ALARP NAL NAL NAL 
C AL ALARP ALARP NAL NAL 
D AL AL ALARP ALARP NAL 
E AL AL AL ALARP ALARP 
Table 4.3: Risk Acceptability Matrix introduced with an example in [6], where AL 
represents an Acceptable Level, ALARP is the As Low As Reasonable Practicable 
Level and NAL is the Not Acceptable Level. 
 
This procedure is especially useful in cases in which imitated accidental data are 
available. 
An Example will be introduced from [8]. Hazard scenarios are the abnormal 
conditions that are assumed to occur during construction and  the lifetime of a 
structure. In a hazard-specific approach, they are specific abnormal damage, 
without regard to the cause. The terms hazard-specific and non-hazard specific 
design categorize the manner hazard scenarios. 
Hazard-specific design is based on specific hazards to the structure that could 
possibly occur; these abnormal events and the ensuing effects must be derived 
and quantified based on available data, statistical analysis and engineering 
judgment. 
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The performance objectives are used to specify the acceptable or tolerable 
response of a structure to the hazard scenarios [9] and [10]. They should Be 
defined at a global level, that is as an acceptable extent of collapse and 
acceptable other consequences of a hazard with a specified intensity and 
associated return period. An example of a performance matrix, expressed in 
terms of acceptable degrees of damage, which can form the basis for 
performance-based design with global performance objectives is shown in table 
4.4. local performance objectives can alternatively serve as simplified and 
substitute criteria for achieving global objectives. Important point as noted in 
[8] is that specifying the performance objectives is not intrinsically an 
engineering problem. It can be supported by professionals but must reflect the 
desires of the owner, the concern of parties affected by a given project and its 
possible collapse, and last but not least the public opinion [9] and [10]. The 
expected consequences in terms of fatalities can be the major parameter that 
sets the failure limits to a particular structure. An  example of fatality criteria, 
produced as F-N curves by [11], is given in figure 4.3. While F-N curves deal 
with life safety issues, there is no comparable method to consider non-life safety 
related consequences. 
 
Event Size CC1 CC2 CC3 
Very Large Severe High Moderate 
Large High Moderate Mild 
Medium Moderate Mild Mild 
Small Mild Mild Mild 
Table 4.4: A performance matrix for with acceptable degrees of damage for consequences 
classes CC1 to CC3 taken from [8]. 
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Figure 4.3: F-N curves relating expected fatalities (N) from an accidental event 
and the annual frequency of occurrence (F) of event with no less than 
N fatalities [11]. 
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4.3 Modelling of Failure Consequences 
Consideration of failure consequences is essential in structural design and 
assessment, as well as in the evaluation of robustness of structural systems. In  
Eurocode [1] consequences classes are established for the purpose of reliability 
differentiation and the specification of recommended minimum values for 
reliability index. In EN 1991-1-7, consequences classes are used to differentiate 
structures with respect to how accidental design situations should be 
considered.  The Eurocode [1] defines classes consequences related to the 
building type and function as shown in table 4.5 of [1].  
 
Class1 Description Examples 
CC1 
 
Low consequences for loss of human life, ad 
economic, social or environmental 
consequences are small or negligible 
Agricultural buildings where 
people not normally enter, 
greenhouses 
CC2 
Medium consequences for loss of human life, 
economic, social or environmental 
consequences are considerable 
Residential and office buildings, 
public buildings where failure 
consequences are medium 
CC3 
High consequences for loss of human life, or 
economic, social or environmental 
consequences are very great 
Grandstands, public buildings 
where the consequences of 
failure are high (e.g. concert hall) 
Table 4.5 Consequences classes in Eurocodes, EN 1990 [1]. 
  The risk assessment can be either qualitative or quantitative but in either case, 
the acceptable risk ought to be considered through an explicit consideration of 
the likelihood of undesirable events and associated consequences, typically in 
the form of a risk matrix as seen in the previous paragraph of this thesis work. 
 
4.3.1 Direct and Indirect Consequences 
The risk assessment of a given system is facilitated by considering the generic 
representation illustrated in figure 4.4 taken from [13]. Different exposure 
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event (first rectangle), typically arriving from external loads act on part of the 
structure and lead to constituent failure events and direct consequences 
(second rectangle), defined as all possible immediate consequences associated 
with damages or failures of the constituents of the system. Then indirect or 
follow-up consequences (third rectangle) may occur as a result of the 
combination of constituent failures. In the evaluation of robustness both direct 
and indirect consequences play a major role and their modelling and evaluation 
should be given appropriate attention as defined in [11]. 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Logical representation of interrelation between exposures, constituent 
failures, sequences of constituent failures and consequences [13]. 
 
Direct and indirect consequences will be dependent on such a system definition. 
For example, a major bridge could be considered ‘in context’ , i.e. as part of the 
route that it is on or as part of the wider road network that the route serves. 
Depending on the system definition, the modelling of consequences will have 
different scope and may require different resolution techniques. 
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An interesting an useful expression is the one introduced by [12], the 
robustness index that measures the fraction of the total system risk resulting 
from direct consequences. 
  =  +  (4.4) 
Clearly this index takes values from zero to one, depending on the relative 
distribution between direct and indirect consequences. A completely robust 
system, with no indirect consequences will have a robustness index of 1. 
Whereas, at the other extreme, if all the risk is due to indirect consequences the 
robustness index will be equal to 0.   
4.3.2 Categorization of Consequences 
One of the main steps of a consequences analysis is the quantification of the 
‘cost of failure’. A systematic procedure to describe and if possible quantify 
consequences is required. In general consequences resulting from civil 
structures failure may be divided into four main categories: 
• Human; 
• Economic; 
• Environmental;  
• Social. 
Table 4.6 present a list, certainly not exhaustive, for the purpose of undertaking 
risk assessment of major structural systems. As described above the 
consequences can be direct or indirect; note that according to the system under 
investigation the same consequence can be direct or indirect. 
It is evident that the level and sophistication of the various analysis types 
increases considerably as the range and extent of considered consequences 
widens. [11] suggests advanced structural analysis, considering a multitude of 
non-linear material and geometric effects, when a particular failure scenario 
needs to be taken beyond initial damage and member failure.  
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Type Direct Indirect 
Human Injuries 
Fatalities 
Injuries  
Fatalities 
Psychological damage 
Economic Repair of initial damage 
Replacement/ repair of contents 
Rescue costs 
Clean up costs 
Replacement/ repair of structures/ contents 
Rescue costs 
Clean up costs 
Collateral damage to surroundings 
Loss of functionality/ production/ business 
Temporary relocation 
Traffic delay/management costs 
Regional economic effects 
Investigations/ compensations 
Infrastructure inter-dependency costs 
Environmental CO2 emissions 
Energy use 
Pollutant releases 
CO2 emissions 
Energy use 
Pollutant releases 
Environmental clean-up/ reversibility 
Social  Loss of reputation 
Erosion of public confidence 
Undue changes in professional practice. 
   
Table 4.6: Categorization of consequences [11]. 
These consequences can be measured in terms of damaged, destroyed, 
expended or lost assets and utilities such as raw materials, goods, services and 
lives. They may also include intangibles, either from a practical or theoretical 
standpoint especially in the case of social consequences and long-term 
environmental influences. Where possible the consequences should be 
described in monetary units, though this is not easy to achieve, and may not be 
desirable or, indeed, universally acceptable.  
Sources for the quantification of consequences from structural failures can be 
found in literature and some examples text are collected by [11].  
• natural hazards loss estimation manuals (e.g. [14]); 
• benchmark studies (e.g. [15]); 
• reports analyzing past failures (e.g.[16] and [17]); 
• industry and regulatory authorities guidelines (e.g. [18] and [19]); 
• insurance reviews (e.g. [20]); 
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• general literature. 
For Example [21] introduce, in case of earthquake, an expression for the 
number of fatalities, Ks, in a particular building 
  = "5+ (4.5) 
 Where 
Km Is the average number of people in the building; 
M2 Is a factor between zero and one related to the building occupancy cycle; 
M3 Is a factor that accounts the fraction of people that would be trapped in a 
collapse following an earthquake; 
M4 Is  a factor related to immediate mortality rates in earthquake event; 
M5 Is  a factor related to post-collapse mortality rates in earthquake event. 
There exists other models, which for example follows an event tree philosophy, 
and the associated conditional probabilities have also been developed for 
regional loss estimation[14]. This study provides an empirical expression for Ks 
in the case of  bridge collapse. 
  =  (4.6) 
 
Where 
NC Is the commuter population 
F Is the ‘usage’ factor which depends on the assumed time of the accident 
(similar to M2). The values range is 0.02 during peak times and 0.01 
otherwise.  
 
Economics consequences models are, on a whole, available for a wide variety of 
building and bridge structures, especially with respect to repair/reconstruction 
costs, typically linked to a damage severity index. An important distinction 
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between structural and non-structural costs is often made, though data for the 
latter are more difficult to collect and categorize.  
 
4.4 Life Quality Index (LQI) 
In cost-benefit-analysis, usually, all losses – including fatalities - are expressed 
in monetary units. For having a method that allows to take the loss of human 
lives accessible to calculations the Life Quality Index Approach (LQI) was 
introduced. This method facilitates the development of risk acceptance criteria 
[22]. The basic idea of the method is to model the preferences of a society 
quantitatively  as a scalar valued Social Indicator comprised by a relationship 
between the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) pro capita g, the expected life at 
birth e and the proportion of life spend for earning a living w. 
  ¡ = ¢£	C0/£ (4.7) 
Where w in developed countries it is assumed ca. 1/8 [6]. 
Every risk measure  will affect  the value of the LQI. The consideration that any 
investment into life risk reduction should lead to an increase  of the LQI leads to 
the following risk acceptance criteria [22]. 
 Δ¢¢ + ΔCC 1 − ¥¥ ≥ 0 (4.8) 
Using LQI in an optimization method, the optimum acceptable Implied Cost of 
Averting Fatality (ICAF) can then be calculated (4.10) and (4.11), considering 
that remaining life of an arbitrary individual equals half of the life expectancy at 
birth, the number of years saved by averting one fatality is given by (4.9).  
 ΔC = C2 (4.9) 
 |Δg|¨©c =	¢C 1 − ¥¥ ΔC = ¢2 1 − ¥¥  (4.10) 
 8 = |Δg|¨©c	ΔC = 	¢C4 1 − ¥¥  (4.11) 
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It should be noticed, that the value expressed by equation (4.11) is not the value 
of one life. The human life is beyond price. ICAF is also not the amount of a 
possible monetary  compensations for the relatives of the victim of the 
occurrence. ICAF is just the monetary value, which society should be willing to 
invest for saving one life according to its ethical principles. 
ICAF vary from 3 to 4 million Euros for developed countries to approximately 
100 000 Euro for developing countries [23]. When conducting a cost-benefit-
approach the ICAF value is utilized for evaluating investments; [24] introduced 
an expression for the evaluation of each individual safety measure. 
 ª«	¬­­ + ®« < 8	:¯« + :°« (4.12) 
Where 
Clk Is the investment cost; 
CAk Is the annual maintenance/operation costs; 
T Is the desired lifetime of measure; 
dRHk Is the risk reduction due to measure k related to human risk; 
dRCk Is the risk reduction due to measure k related to economic risk; 
δ(T) Is a discount rate. 
 
When the inequity is satisfied means that the safety measure is beneficial. Note 
that the parameters entering the inequity are associated to significant 
variability and in many cases the risk reduction effect cannot be easily 
quantified.   
The acceptability limits (or targets) for probabilities of failure should take into 
account, implicitly or explicitly, for probabilities of failure, potential losses, 
amount of investments necessity to improve reliability, and possibly 
combination of all these factors.  
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4.5 Target Reliability levels 
The choice of a target reliability is an important first step for the calibration of 
structural design codes as well as during the probabilistic design of structures 
outside the code envelope. The risk acceptance criteria are introduced in 
precodification documents and structural codes as [1], [3] and [4] that will be 
analyzed in this paragraph.  
 
4.5.1 Target Reliability in Codes 
In Eurocodes [1], this information are given in terms of target and acceptable 
failure probabilities and associated reliability indices and used to obtain safety 
factors for design purpose. The values reflected the possible failure 
consequences, the reference time period, usually 1-year, is used and are valid 
for component failure (see table 4.7). 
The probabilistic model code [4] issued by JCSS  provides a tentative target 
reliabilities for different structural classes. The target reliabilities relate to 
structural system failure and have been designed based on monetary 
optimization studies. The target reliabilities in this case are given as a function 
of the costs of the risk reduction measure and the consequences in case of 
failure, both defined relative to the initial construction costs of the structure. 
The target reliability (tab. 4.8) were defined in consistency with the results of a 
parameter study performed by Rackwitz (See Annex B of [4]). 
The information provided by these tables are the reliability index related to a 
specific reference period. Table 4.7 of [1] provides reliability index β for two 
different reference period (1 year and 50 year), without any explicit link to the 
design working life Td. 
It’s important to note that the β values given by [1], βa and βd, for each reliability 
class correspond to the same reliability level. Practical application of these 
values depends on the time period Ta considered in the design, which may be 
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connected with available statistical information concerning time variant actions 
(e.g. wind, earthquake etc.).   
Similar value of βd of table 4.7 are given by ISO [3] for a design working life Td, 
called in ISO, ‘life time’, without specification of any particular value of Td. Table 
4.9 shows the reliability index differentiated by two factors: the relative costs of 
safety measures and consequences of failure. 
 
Reliability 
Class 
Consequences for 
loss of human life, 
economic, social 
and environmental 
Reliability index β 
Example of buildings 
and civil engineering 
works 
βa for Ta=1 y βd for Td=50 y 
RC3 - High High 5.2 4.3 Bridges, Public buildings 
RC2 - Normal Medium 4.7 3.8 Residential and offices 
RC1 - Low Low 4.2 3.3 Agricultural buildings 
Table 4.7: Reliability classification in accordance with Eurocode [1]. 
 
Relative cost 
of safety 
measure 
 Consequences of failure 
 Minor  Moderate  Large 
 β Pf  β Pf  β Pf 
Large (A)  3.1 ∼10-3  3.3 ∼5 10-4  3.7 ∼10-4 
Normal (B)  3.7 ∼10-4  4.2 ∼10-5  4.4 ∼5 10-6 
Small (C)  4.2 ∼10-5  4.4 ∼5 10-6  4.7 ∼10-6 
Table 4.8: Tentative target reliabilities related to one year reference period and ultimate 
limit state according to JCSS [4]. 
 
Relative cost of 
safety measure 
 Consequences of failure 
 Small Some Moderate Great 
High  0 1.5 2.3 3.1 
Moderate  1.3 2.3 3.1 3.8 
Low  2.3 3.1 3.8 4.3 
Table 4.9: Target reliability index for design working life Td given by ISO [3]. 
 
It appears that available documents do not provide direct and explicit guidance 
on how to take into account β values when the design working life time Td is 
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different, as in many design situation, from the one used to calculate these 
values. Lifetime acceptable failure probabilities can be approximately obtained 
according to JCSS [4] by multiplying the annual failure probability value by the 
working life Td and by a factor c that accounts for the dependence of different 
failure events within the year. In many cases, as mentioned in [5] the annual 
failure events are independent and consequently c ≅ 1.  
 
4.5.2 Variation with Time  
When system is affected by  time  for example in case of wind or earthquake, the 
failure probability Pf is also time variant and should always be related to a 
certain reference period T, which may be generally different from the design 
working life Td. The next discussion, follows [], considering a structure of a given 
reliability level, the design failure probability Pd=Pn related to a reference period 
Tn=nT1 can be derived from the alternative probability Pa=P1 corresponding to 
Ta=T1 (to simplify notation note that previously used subscript ‘d’ corresponds 
now to ‘n’ and ‘a’ to ‘1’). It is possible to write 
 
  = 1 − 1 − 0U (4.13) 
 
Where n is the reference time under exam. For very small probabilities, this 
relationship could be further simplified as  
  = 0 ­­0 (4.14) 
 
T1 and Tn can have arbitrary value, however usually T1 is one year. Probability 
Pn increase (almost linearly) with Tn.   
It follows from equation (4.14) that reliability indexes β1 = βa  and βn = βd are 
related as follows 
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 ΦU  QΦ0RU (4.15) 
Figure 4.5 shows variation of βn with β1 for n=5, 25, 50 and 100. Note  that if the 
reference period T1 is one year, then n indicates the number of years of the 
reference period n (n=Tn). 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Variation of βn with βn for n= 5, 25, 50, 100 []. 
 
Note that in 1-year period would be used for specification of the target 
reliability level of a structure, then graph of figure 4.5 provides information on 
the resulting failure probability corresponding to a given working life Tn. 
For example, if the target reliability level is specified by the reliability index 
β1=4,7 then the reliability level of a structure having a working life, Tn=50 years 
is characterized by β50=3.8. At the same way when Tn=5 year is used then β5=4.3 
or when Tn=100 years then β100=3.6. 
So as seen in this paragraph the reliability level of a structure can be specified 
using different time periods T, which may not necessarily coincide with the 
design working life Td.   
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4.6 Cost Optimization 
The decision to accept risk is not based on the absolute notion of one acceptable 
risk level but has some flexibility as the judgment depends on the cost/benefit 
ratio. It is always possible to reduce the risk of a hazardous facility. But the 
incremental costs needed for reducing risk by an additional unit increase as the 
risk becomes smaller. The money has to be used in such way that maximum 
level of reliability is reached. The optimal allocation of founds is a classical 
optimization problem. For conducting an optimization problem these quantities 
have to be defined: 
• B(x) is the benefit derived from the existence of the structure; 
• C(x) is the construction cost; 
• D(x) is the expected cost failure; 
• x is the decision parameter. 
Statistical decision theory dictates how the expected values for B(x), C(x) and 
D(x) have to be taken. B(x), generally, will not be so affected by the decision 
parameter x.  The Optimization concept is shown in figure 4.6. Much debate has 
going on whether to include lives into cost benefit analysis and whether it is at 
all admissible to perform cost benefit analysis when human lives or injuries are 
involves in case of structural failure.  
 
Figure 4.6: Cost and benefits over design parameter x []. 
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 This requires the implementation of a monetary equivalent to save human life 
and limb into the analysis as seen in paragraph 4.5. 
The optimization problem can be solved using the LQI (paragraph 4.4)  
approach.  
 
4.6.1 Probabilistic Optimization 
This paragraph follows the indication proposed by [23]. The probabilistic 
optimization is based on a fundamental form of the objective function expressed 
as the present value of the  total cost Ctot (x, q, n) 
 9, ±,   9, ²¡±, ² +  + 90
U
o0
 (4.16) 
Where 
x Is the decision parameter of the optimization;  
q Is the annual discount rate (e.g. 0.03 average discount ration for Eu); 
n Is the number of year of a considered design working life (e.g. 50, 
100); 
Pf(x, i) Is the failure probability in year i; 
Cf Is the malfunctioning cost (due to loss of structural functionality); 
Q(q, i) Is the discount factor dependent on the annual rate q and the number; 
of years I; 
C0 Is the initial cost independent of the decision parameter x;  
C1 Is the cost per unit of the decision parameter x. 
 
Note that design working life is given here as a deterministic quantity 
characterized by the number of years n.  
Assuming almost independent failure events in subsequent years, the annual 
probability of failure Pf(x, i) in year I is given by the geometric sequence 
65 
 
 9, ²  91 − 9o/0 (4.17) 
The initial probability of failure p(x) is dependent on the decision parameter of 
structural resistance x. Note that annual failure probabilities can be assumed to 
be independent when failure probabilities are chiefly influences by time-variant 
loads (climatic actions, traffic loads and accidental loads), then the failure 
probability Pfn(x) during years can be estimated by the sum of the sequence  
Pf(x, i) given as 
 9,   1 − 1 − 9U (4.18) 
 
 When with small probabilities p(x)<10-3 , [23] suggests to approximate (4.18) 
with the following expression 
 9,   1 − h1 − 9iU ≅ 		9 (4.19) 
The discount factor of the present value of the expected future costs in year I is 
considered in the usual form as 
 ¡±, ²  11 + ±o (4.20) 
 
Thus the cost of malfunctioning Cf is discounted by the factor Q(q, i) depending 
on the discount rate q and the point in time (number of years i) when the loss of 
structural utility occurs. 
Considering equations (4.16) and (4.20), the total costs Ctot(x, q, n) introduced 
by [23] becomes 
 9, ±,   	9¡9, ±,  +  + 90 (4.21) 
Note that for small probabilities of failure p(x)  and very small discount rate q, 
the time factor PQ(x, q, n) ≅ n 
The necessary condition for the minimum of the total cost follows form 
equation (4.16) 
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 ´9, ±, ´9  ¡±, ² µ
´9, ²´9 ¶cc·¸¹
+ 0
U
o0
 (4.22) 
 
This equation represents a general form of the necessary condition for the 
minimum of total cost Ctot(x, q, n) and the optimum value x=xopt of the parameter 
x and the optimum annual probability of failure popt = p(xopt). Expression (4.22) 
can be written also as  
 ¡±, ² µ´9, ²´9 ¶cc·¸¹
 −0
U
o0
 (4.23) 
 
The optimum probability for the total design working life Td = n (years) follows 
from (4.19) as 
 ,º  1 − 1 − ºU ≅ º (4.24) 
The corresponding optimum reliability index is 
 º  −Φ,º (4.25) 
These quantities are generally affected by cost ratio –C1/Cf, the discount ratio q 
and the design working life n. 
[23] shows how the theoretical optimum reliability index decreases with 
increasing working design life n. This is due to the effect of discounting. Thus 
the optimal reliability index βopt slightly decreases with increasing design 
working life. 
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Chapter 5 
Study Case  
The last years have seen a big sensibility on the argument of renewable 
energies. Two are the main reasons to this tendency: in the firsthand it’s known 
that the fossil combustibles are not unlimited  so it is necessary to find other 
solutions for the energy requirements, on the other hand fossil combustible and 
nuclear energy are one of the main reason of air and environmental pollution. 
Thus the aim of this work is, selected the solar energy as argument, to optimize 
the structure of the solar panel ground anchored. And to propose an 
optimization procedure that could be used in other similar cases. 
 
5.1 Renewable Energies 
Renewable energy is generally defined as the “energy that comes from 
resources which are continually replenished on a human timescale such as 
sunlight, wind, rain, tides, waves and geothermal heat” [1].  
Renewable energy markets, industries, and policy frameworks have evolved 
rapidly in recent years. The Renewables Global Status Report provides a 
comprehensive and timely overview of renewable energy market, industry, 
investment, and policy developments worldwide.  
From the end of 2004, worldwide renewable energy capacity grew at rates of 
10–60% annually for many technologies. For wind power and many other 
renewable technologies, growth accelerated in 2009 relative to the previous 
four years [2]. More wind power capacity was added during 2009 than any 
other renewable technology. However, grid-connected photovoltaic increased 
the fastest of all renewables technologies, with a 60% annual average growth 
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rate[2]. In 2010, renewable power constituted about a third of the newly built 
power generation capacities. By 2014 the installed capacity of photovoltaic will 
likely exceed that of wind, but due to the lower capacity factor of solar, the 
energy generated from photovoltaic is not expected to exceed that of wind until 
2015 (fig. 5.1)[3]. 
Projections vary, but scientists have advanced a plan to power 100% of the 
world's energy with wind, hydroelectric, and solar power by the year 2030 [4]. 
According to a 2011 projection by the International Energy Agency, solar power 
generators may produce most of the world’s electricity within 50 years, 
dramatically reducing the emissions of greenhouse gases that harm the 
environment. Cedric Philibert, senior analyst in the renewable energy division 
at the IEA said: “Photovoltaic and solar-thermal plants may meet most of the 
world’s demand for electricity by 2060 -- and half of all energy needs -- with 
wind, hydropower and biomass plants supplying much of the remaining 
generation”. “Photovoltaic and concentrated solar power together can become 
the major source of electricity” [5].               
 
Fig 5.1: Projected growth of wind power and photovoltaic, based 
on history through 2011 [3]. 
Renewable energy technologies are getting cheaper, through technological 
change and through the benefits of mass production and market competition. A 
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2011 IEA report said: "A portfolio of renewable energy technologies is 
becoming cost-competitive in an increasingly broad range of circumstances, in 
some cases providing investment opportunities without the need for specific 
economic support," and added that "cost reductions in critical technologies, 
such as wind and solar, are set to continue."[6] 
Hydro-electricity and geothermal electricity produced at favorable sites are now 
the cheapest way to generate electricity. Renewable energy costs continue to 
drop, and the leveled cost of electricity is declining for wind power, solar 
photovoltaic, concentrated solar power and some biomass technologies.[7] 
Renewable energy is also the most economical solution for new grid-connected 
capacity in areas with good resources. As the cost of renewable power falls, the 
scope of economically viable applications increases. Renewable technologies are 
now often the most economical solution for new generating capacity. Where 
“oil-fired generation is the predominant power generation source (e.g. on 
islands, off-grid and in some countries) a lower-cost renewable solution almost 
always exists today”.[7] 
A series of studies by the US National Renewable Energy Laboratory modeled 
the "grid in the Western US under a number of different scenarios where 
intermittent renewables accounted for 33% of the total power." In the models, 
inefficiencies in cycling the fossil fuel plants to compensate for the variation in 
solar and wind energy resulted in an additional cost of "between $0.47 and 
$1.28 to each MW hour generated"; however, the savings in the cost of the fuels 
saved "adds up to $7 billion, meaning the added costs are, at most, two percent 
of the savings."[8] 
 
5.1.2 Some Data about Renewable Energies in the last years 
Global demand for renewable energy continued to rise during 2011 and 2012, 
supplying an estimated 19% of global final energy consumption in 2011 (the 
latest year for which data are available), with a little less than half from 
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traditional biomass. Useful heat energy from modern renewable sources 
accounted for an estimated 4.1% of total final energy use; hydropower made up 
about 3.7%; and an estimated 1.9% was provided by power from wind, solar, 
geothermal, and biomass, and by biofuels.  
Total renewable power capacity worldwide exceeded 1,470 GW in 2012, up 
about 8.5% from 2011. Hydropower rose 3% to an estimated 990 GW, while 
other renewables grew 21.5% to exceed 480 GW. Globally, wind power 
accounted for about 39% of renewable power capacity added in 2012, followed 
by hydropower and solar photovoltaic, each accounting for approximately 26% 
[2]. 
The top countries for renewable power capacity at 2012 end were China, the 
United States, Brazil, Canada, and Germany; the top countries for non-hydro 
capacity were China, the United States, and Germany, followed by Spain, Italy, 
and India. By region, the BRICS nations accounted for 36% of total global 
renewable power capacity and almost 27% of non-hydro renewable capacity. 
The EU had the most non-hydro capacity at the end of 2012, with approximately 
44% of the global total.  
Renewables represent a rapidly rising share of energy supply in a growing 
number of countries and regions:  
• In China, wind power generation increased more than generation from 
coal and passed nuclear power output for the first time; 
•  In the European Union, renewables accounted for almost 70% of 
additions to electric capacity in 2012, mostly from solar photovoltaic 
and wind power. In 2011 (the latest year for which data are available), 
renewables met 20.6% of the region’s electricity consumption and 
13.4% of gross final energy consumption; 
•  In Germany, renewables accounted for 22.9% of electricity consumption 
(up from 20.5% in 2011), 10.4% of national heat use, and 12.6% of total 
final energy demand; 
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• The United States added more capacity from wind power than any other 
technology, and all renewables made up about half of total electric 
capacity additions during the year; 
• Wind and solar power are achieving high levels of penetration in 
countries like Denmark and Italy, which in 2012 generated 30% of 
electricity with wind and 5.6% with solar PV, respectively. 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Selected indicators of years 2010-2012 [9]. 
Solar power was the leading sector by far in terms of money committed in 2012, 
receiving 57% of total new investment in renewable energy (96% of which 
went to solar PV). Even so, the USD 140.4 billion for solar was down 11% from 
2011 levels, due to a slump in financing of CSP projects in Spain and the United 
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States, as well as to sharply lower PV system prices. Solar was followed by wind 
power (USD 80.3 billion) and hydropower projects larger than 50 MW 
(estimated at USD 33 billion) [9]. 
The mainstream renewable energies are the following: 
• Wind Power; 
• Hydropower; 
• Solar Energy; 
• Biomass; 
• Geothermal energy. 
A brief description of wind power and Solar energy will be given in the next 
paragraphs. 
 
5.2 Energies Description 
5.2.1 Wind Power 
Wind power is the conversion of wind energy in any kind of useful energy. 
Usually we can think to wind turbines to make electrical power, windmills for 
mechanical power, wind pumps for water pumping or drainage ore sails to 
propel ships. 
Wind power, as an alternative to fossil fuels, is plentiful, renewable, widely 
distributed, clean, produces no greenhouse gas emissions during operation and 
uses little land. 
Sailboats and sailing ships have been using wind power for thousands of 
years(fig 5.3), and architects have used wind-driven natural ventilation in 
buildings since similarly ancient times. The use of wind to provide mechanical 
power came somewhat later in antiquity. The wind wheel of the Greek engineer 
Heron of Alexandria in the 1st century AD is the earliest known instance of 
using a wind-driven wheel to power a machine [10]. 
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Figure 5.3: Oracle’s AC72 American’s Cup Sail boat 2013, using wind power to reach 
speeds up to 47knots (ca. 88km/h). 
 
The first windmills were in use in Persia at least by the 9th century and possibly 
as early as the 7th century. The use of windmills became widespread across the 
Middle East and Central Asia, and later spread to China and India. By 1000 AD, 
windmills were used to pump seawater for salt-making in China and Sicily. 
Windmills were used extensively in Northwestern Europe to grind flour from 
the 1180s, and wind-pumps were used to drain land for agriculture and for 
building.  
 
Figure 5.4: Cherubina, University’ s of Pisa Competition Sail Boat 2013. 
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First time that someone used wind power for generating electricity was  in July 
1887, a Scottish academic Professor, James Blyth, built a cloth-sailed wind 
turbine in the garden of his holiday cottage in Marykirk and used the electricity 
it produced to charge accumulators which he used to power the lights in his 
cottage. 
 
Figure 5.5: Advertisement for a wind-powered electric system, 1897. 
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Figure 5.6: left side the wind farm of  Bangui Windfarm Ilocos Norte, Philippines and on 
the right side the offshore wind farm of London Array, United Kingdom. 
 
Now a days wind power is growing up very fast. During 2012, almost 45 GW of 
wind power capacity began operation, increasing global wind capacity 19% to 
almost 283 GW. The trend of the last 20 years could be seen in figure 5.5 [9]. To 
reach these values wind farm in big quantities are needed. The last years sow in 
fact a big increasing in wind farms and offshore wind farms realization. A wind 
farm is a group of wind turbines in the same location used for production of 
electricity (fig 5.6). 
 
Figure 5.7: Wind global capacity for the years 1996-2012 [9]. 
5.2.2 Solar Energy 
Solar energy, radiant light and heat from the sun, is harnessed using a range of 
ever-evolving technologies such as  
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• solar heating;  
• solar photovoltaic (PV);  
• solar thermal electricity; 
• solar architecture; 
• artificial photosynthesis. 
This work will focalized on PV structures, please refer to other specialized 
authors for definition and description of the others systems. 
The Photovoltaic system, that will be called PV, is a device that converts light 
into electric current using the photovoltaic effect. The first cell was constructed 
by Charles Fritts in the 1880s. Obviously the efficiency of these cells was very 
low (ca.1%). During all the XX century researchers worked on the developing of 
these systems and today solar cell energy conversion efficiencies for 
commercially available PV are around 14-22%. But the developed cells reach an 
efficiencies up to 44%. 
The 2012 was for the solar PV market a strong year, with total global operating 
capacity reaching the 100 GW milestone. The market was fairly stable relative to 
2011, with slightly less capacity brought on line but likely higher shipment 
levels, and the more than 29.4 GW added represented nearly one-third of total 
global capacity in operation at year’s end (figure 5.8 and 5.9).
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Figure 5.8: Solar PV global capacity 1995-2012[9]. 
 
The thin film market share fell from 15% in 2011 to 13% in 2012. Eight 
countries added more than 1 GW of solar PV to their grids in 2012, and the 
distribution of new installations continued to broaden. The top markets—
Germany, Italy, China, the United States, and Japan—were also the leaders for 
total capacity. By year’s end, eight countries in Europe, three in Asia, the United 
States, and Australia had at least 1 GW of total capacity. 
The leaders for solar PV per inhabitant were Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Czech 
Republic, Greece, and Australia.[9] 
 
 
Figure 5.9: Solar PV global capacity and additions. Top 10 countries 2012[9]. 
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Figure 5.10: Solar PV global capacity, shares of top 10 countries 2012[9]. 
 
5.3 Solar Panels Structures  
As shown  the last years have seen a large scale increasing in installation 
renewable energies systems and in particular the solar panels had an high 
importance. Thus this thesis work will focalize on reliability aspects and cost 
optimization analysis of these structures. 
The solar panel system can be divided in two big groups according to the place 
of installation: 
• Buildings roofs; 
• Ground. 
The roof mounting systems (fig. 5.11) consist of solar modules held in place by 
racks or frames attached to roof-based mounting supports. Roof-based 
mounting supports include: 
• Pole mounts which are attached directly to the roof structure and may 
use additional rails for attaching the module racking or frames; 
• Ballasted footing mounts, such as concrete or steel bases that use weight 
to secure the panel system in position and do not require through 
penetration. This mounting method allows for decommissioning or 
relocation of solar panel system with no adverse effect on the roof 
structure. 
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Figure 5.11: Roof mounting solar panel system 
 
The Ground mounted system (fig. 5.12) consist of solar modules held in place by 
racks of frames that are attached to ground based mounting support that 
include: 
• Pile mounts, which are derived directly into the ground or embedded in 
concrete; 
• Foundation mounts, such as concrete slabs or poured footings; 
• Ballasted footing mounts such as concrete or steel bases that use weight 
to secure the solar module system in position and do not require ground 
penetration.  
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Figure 5.12: Ground mounted system example. 
 
The ground mounted system  can be divided in two big groups: 
• Fixed Panel; 
• Solar Tracker. 
The fixed panel (fig 5.13) are fixed structures anchored to a support the usually 
can be of two kinds: the roof or the ground. These kind of structures are simple, 
easy to build and not so expensive compared to the solar tracker. The 
maintenance is limited to the aluminum structures and to the cells itself. On the 
other hand we have less efficiency because the plane of the panel has not always 
an optimal angle than the sun position. This deficiency is bypassed in the case of 
Solar Trackers. A solar tracker (fig. 5.14) is a device that orients a payload 
toward the sun. In the case of PV trackers are used to minimize the angle of 
incidence between the incoming sunlight and a PV panel. This increases the 
amount of energy produced from a fixed amount of installed power generating 
capacity.   
 
Figure 5.13: Fixed solar panel example. 
 
84 
 
It is estimate that trackers are used in at least 85% of commercial installations 
greater than 1MW. As said the increasing in the efficiency of the energy 
production is paid by the cost of the mechanical complexity and the need of 
maintenance. So case be case the designer should evaluate witch kind of system 
fits better the  design problem. 
 
 
Figure 5.14: Solar trackers example. 
 
 
5.4 Ground Solar Panel Structures 
5.4.1 Superstructure 
The solar panel structures are prefabricated systems that consist in assembling 
profiles, commonly metal, able to support the modules, to anchor them to the 
ground and improve their exposure.  
It’s possible to distinguish three kind of structures: 
• Bracket structure; 
• Single pole Structure. 
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The one or the other kind of structure are chosen in relation to design aspects: 
dimensions, loads, ground etc. the Bracket structures needs a less important 
understructure compare to the single pole one. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.15: three examples of solar panel structures. the first two are bracket  
structures and the third is a single pole structure. 
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5.4.1 Substructure 
The substructure, foundation, of the solar panel structures depends on different 
design parameters. The most influential parameter is the soil. According to the 
soil characteristics the designer can choose between different kind of 
foundations  listed below: 
• Spread footing foundation; 
• Drilled piles; 
• Micro piles; 
• Screw Piles. 
 
Spread Founding Foundation 
If the loads transmitted by the superstructure and the geotechnical 
characteristics of the site permit, the foundation on plinths is certainly the most 
simple and less impact; on the other hand it has the peculiarity of not being 
reusable, not quick to do and not realize dismissible; then this foundation is not 
always well seen by the customer and by the various entities in the process of 
applying for permits.  
If the loads to be transmitted to the ground are relevant dimensions of the 
plinth grow rapidly, until getting to the limits that may reach an not convenient 
point. 
 
Figure 5.16: Spread Founding Foundation. 
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Drilled piles 
When the loads on the foundation are relevant, as in the case of photovoltaic 
systems greenhouse, or when the soil in situ is characterized by poor 
mechanical properties the use of deep foundations is convenient.  
The use of drilled piles can significantly reduce the size of the plinth surface (if 
not even to eliminate it), that in such unfavorable conditions can become 
disproportionate, and also allows you to affect deep layers of soil with better 
strength and deformability characteristics.  
Given the size of the drilled piles usually the optimal solution envisages the use 
of a only pile, which connects to the superstructure or by a plinth connection or 
in a direct manner. 
 
Figure 5.17: reinforcement of a Drilled Pile. 
 
Micro piles 
The solution with micro piles lends itself , such as those with drilled piles to 
support relevant actions on the low resistance grounds.  
The advantage is the possibility of having, for the same equipment of 
construction site, a greater number of alternatives in terms of diameter and 
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length, with the possibility of adapting the shape of the foundation to the loads 
actually agents at that point. 
Because of the small diameter of the micro piles it will always be necessary to 
provide a nut upper connection with the superstructure, an element that, as 
already mentioned, in case of use of drilled piles had the possibility to be 
omitted.  
Compared to drilled piles , micro piles are also less suited to support shear 
actions. The machines for the realization of micro piles are certainly less bulky 
and this greatly simplifies the construction activities, especially when operating 
under unfavorable conditions (poor accessibility, distance from the main roads 
etc.). 
 
Screw Piles 
The screw piles are prefabricated steel piles with one or more propellers, 
available at various geometries and configurations, which are screwed into the 
ground by simple equipment which can be easily mounted on the most common 
operators machines. 
This implies the almost total absence of a construction site for the foundation, 
fundamental aspect when you are operating in rural areas hardly reached, and 
extreme rapidity of execution.  
The most common types available on the market have a length between 1.5 and 
3 meters, with diameters between 77 and 130 mm and propellers whose 
diameter can be between 180 and 250 mm.  
This type of pile is adequate to withstand both compressive and tensile stresses. 
Thanks also the ability to remove and reuse these elements, screw piles are  
deemed convenient for the foundations of light structures such as those on the 
ground, placed in a short time and with a certain operating life. 
For this study these kind of structures will be analyzed. 
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Figure 5.18: Typical screw piles images. 
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Chapter 6 
Economic Analysis 
This work is divided into two big parts a first one, the reliability analysis, and 
the second one, the cost optimization analysis. For this second phase is 
necessary to have an idea of economic aspects that are behind a PV farm. 
This study will focalized on big PV farms, and will due with probabilistic 
approach in optimization studies. Compare to normal design this kind of 
approach needs larger investments in the first phase, the one where 
informations are collected, but can lead at the end to economic saving. 
The income statement will be described in general and a real case, useful for the 
economic optimization of this thesis, will be analyzed. The specific case study is 
about a 1.4 MW PV pharm; for privacy aspects the name and location of the farm 
will be not specified.   
 
 
6.2 Income Statement Aspects 
The income statement portrays the net results of operations of an enterprise 
Since results are what enterprises are supposed to achieve and since their value 
is, in large measure, determined by the size and quality of these results, it 
follows quite logically that the analyst attaches great importance to the income 
statement. 
The income statement is the schedule that shows the income and expenses of a 
business enterprise over a period of time and then gives a final figure 
representing the amount of profit or loss for the accounting period.  
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It indicates how the revenues (money received from the sale of products and 
services before expenses are taken out, also known as the "top line") are 
transformed into the net income (the result after all revenues and expenses 
have been accounted for, also known as "net profit" or the "bottom line"). It 
displays the revenues recognized for a specific period, and the cost and 
expenses charged against these revenues, including write-offs (e.g., depreciation 
and amortization of various assets) and taxes [1]. The purpose of the income 
statement is to show managers and investors whether the company made or 
lost money during the period being reported. 
The income statement can be prepared in one of two methods[2]. The Single 
Step income statement takes a simpler approach, totaling revenues and 
subtracting expenses to find the bottom line. The more complex Multi-Step 
income statement (as the name implies) takes several steps to find the bottom 
line, starting with the gross profit. It then calculates operating expenses and, 
when deducted from the gross profit, yields income from operations. Adding to 
income from operations is the difference of other revenues and other expenses. 
When combined with income from operations, this yields income before taxes. 
The final step is to deduct taxes, which finally produces the net income for the 
period measured. 
The main points that are introduced and discussed in this work since they are 
present in the  analyzed study case are: 
• CAPEX; 
• Depreciation Rate; 
• Leasing; 
• Inflation; 
• Revenues; 
• Operating Costs; 
• EBITDA and EBIT; 
• PBT; 
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• Taxes; 
• Net Income; 
• Dividends; 
• Equity Cash Flows; 
• IRR. 
The following discussion and explanation wants to be only a brief introduction 
to the argument and not a complete and exhaustive treatment of the problem. 
For more complex and exhaustive information about the income statement refer 
to the specific technical authors present in the references of this chapter. 
 
6.2.1 CAPEX 
The Capital expenditures (CAPEX) are expenditures creating future benefits. A 
capital expenditure is incurred when a business spends money either to buy 
fixed assets or to add to the value of an existing fixed asset with a useful life 
extending beyond the taxable year.  
CAPEX are used by a company to acquire or upgrade physical assets such as 
equipment, property, or industrial buildings. In the case when a capital 
expenditure constitutes a major financial decision for a company, the 
expenditure must be formalized at an annual shareholders meeting or a special 
meeting of the Board of Directors. In accounting, a capital expenditure is added 
to an asset account ("capitalized"), thus increasing the asset's basis (the cost or 
value of an asset adjusted for tax purposes). CAPEX is commonly found on the 
cash flow statement under "Investment in Plant, Property, and Equipment" or 
something similar in the Investing subsection. 
In this study case the CAPEX refers to the initial investment needed to build the 
PV farm. The analyzed farm has a power of 1000 KWp and the CAPEX is 
1.060.000,00 € so the producible energy per KWp is 1.480,00 KWh/KWp and 
the total producible energy is 1.480.000 KWh. These data are summarized in the 
following table (tab 6.1) 
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Installed Capacity KWp 1000 
CAPEX € 1.060.000,00 
CAPEX per MW € 1.060,00 
Producible energy per KWp KWh/KWp 1.480,00 
Total Producible Energy KWh 1.480.000 
Table 6.1: Summarized CAPEX and Producible energy of the study case. 
 
6.2.2 Depreciation Rate 
In determining the profits (net income) from an activity, the receipts from the 
activity must be reduced by appropriate costs. One such cost is the cost of assets 
used but not immediately consumed in the activity. Such cost so allocated in a 
given period is equal to the reduction in the value placed on the asset, which is 
initially equal to the amount paid for the asset and subsequently may or may not 
be related to the amount expected to be received upon its disposal. Depreciation 
is any method of allocating such net cost to those periods in which the 
organization is expected to benefit from use of the asset. The asset is referred to 
as a depreciable asset. Depreciation is technically a method of allocation, not 
valuation, even though it determines the value placed on the asset in the balance 
sheet. 
Any business or income producing activity using tangible assets may incur costs 
related to those assets. If an asset is expected to produce a benefit in future 
periods, some of these costs must be deferred rather than treated as a current 
expense. The business then records depreciation expense in its financial 
reporting as the current period's allocation of such costs. This is usually done in 
a rational and systematic manner. In this case a Depreciation rate of 9% is 
computed constant from the first year. That means that each year the 
depreciation quota is: 
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 CAPEX x depreciation rate = 1.060.00 ∙ 0.09 = 95.400,00 € (6.1) 
 
These data are summarized in table 6.2 
 
Depreciation rate  % 9 
Depreciation/year  €/year 95.400,00 
Table 6.2: Summarized Depreciation rate and quota per yare of the study case. 
 
6.2.3  Leasing 
Leasing is a process by which a firm can obtain the use of a certain fixed assets 
for which it must pay a series of contractual, periodic, tax deductible payments. 
The lessee is the receiver of the services or the assets under the lease contract 
and the lessor is the owner of the assets. The relationship between the tenant 
and the landlord is called a tenancy, and can be for a fixed or an indefinite 
period of time (called the term of the lease). The consideration for the lease is 
called rent. A gross lease is when the tenant pays a flat rental amount and the 
landlord pays for all property charges regularly incurred by the ownership from 
lawnmowers and washing machines to handbags and jewelry. 
Under normal circumstances, a freehold owner of property is at liberty to do 
what they want with their property, including destroy it or hand over 
possession of the property to a tenant. However, if the owner has surrendered 
possession to another (the tenant) than any interference with the quiet 
enjoyment of the property by the tenant in lawful possession is unlawful. In the 
study the leasing will be done on 80% of the total amount of CAPEX. The leasing 
tenor is 20 years and the interest rate is 6.5%. 
The data regarding the study case leasing are summarized in table 6.3  
 
Leasing Tenor Years 20 
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Leverage % 80 
Amount € 848.000,00 
Interest Rate % 6.5 
Table 6.3: summarized data on the Leasing of the study case 
 
6.2.4 Inflation 
Inflation is a persistent increase in the general price level of goods and services 
in an economy over a period of time. When the general price level rises, each 
unit of currency buys fewer goods and services. Consequently, inflation reflects 
a reduction in the purchasing power per unit of money – a loss of real value in 
the medium of exchange and unit of account within the economy. A chief 
measure of price inflation is the inflation rate, the annualized percentage change 
in a general price index (normally the consumer price index) over time. 
In this study case the inflation is quantified in 3.5%. 
 
Inflation % 3.5 
Table 6.4: Inflation rate in the study case 
 
6.2.5 Revenues 
Revenue or turnover is the gross inflow of economic benefits during the period, 
arising in the course of the ordinary activities of an entity when those inflows 
result in increases in equity, other than increases relating to contributions from 
equity participants[3]. 
In other words the revenue is income is a company receives from its ordinary 
business activities, usually from the sale of goods and services to customers. In 
many countries, revenue is referred to as turnover. Some companies receive 
revenue from interest, royalties, or other fees [4]. Revenue may refer to 
business income in general, or it may refer to the amount, in a monetary unit, 
received during a period of time, as in "Last year, Company X had revenue of 
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$42 million." Profits or net income generally imply total revenue minus total 
expenses in a given period. In accounting, revenue is often referred to as the 
"top line" due to its position on the income statement at the very top. This is to 
be contrasted with the "bottom line" which denotes net income. 
In the study case the revenues comes from the selling of the farm’s produced 
electricity.  
According to the day of the week three different selling quotation are computed 
in the incoming statement (table 6.5). In this study case no government 
Incentive are computed. 
 
Energy price (F1) €/KWh 0.084 
Energy price (F2 Saturday) €/KWh 0.077 
Energy price (F3 Sunday) €/KWh 0.056 
Incentives €/KWh 0.000 
Table 6.5: Energy selling prices according to the day of the week in the study case 
 
Considering 5/7 for the F1 range, 1/7 for the range F2 and 1/7 for the range F3 
the annually revenges due to electricity production are showed in table 6.6.  
The showed data refers to year one, the first year of the PV farm so annual 
efficiency lost and inflation are not computed in the calculations. 
 
 
 
 
Electricity inlet into the network  KWh 1 480 000 
Energy price (F1)  €/KWh 0.084 
Energy sales  € 88 880.00 
Energy price (F2 Saturday)  €/KWh 0.077 
Energy sales  € 16 280.00 
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Energy price (F3 Sunday)  €/KWh 0.056 
Energy sales  € 11 840.00 
Incentives  €/KWh 0.000 
Energy sales  € 0.000 
Total revenues (first year)  € 116 920.00 
Table 6.6: Total revenue calculations for year 1. 
 
The calculations of the second year are performed for showing how to take in 
account the inflation and the loss of efficiency of the panels. All the calculations 
of the others years are plotted in Annex B. 
In this study case an annual efficiency loss of 0.8% is computed. So the two 
values that influences the total annual revenues are the inflation (3.5%) and the 
annual efficiency loss (0.8%). 
The second year production is computed as the production of year 1 minus the 
loss of efficiency: 
 
Production year n-1 ∙ (1-efficency loss) = 1 480 000 ∙ (1-0.08) = 1 468 160 KWh 
(6.2) 
And the second year revenues due to the production are computed as the 
energy price sales minus the inflation rate: 
 
 Energy price (F1) ∙ (1+0.035) = 0.084 ∙ 1.035 = 0.087 €/KWh (6.3) 
This calculations are performed for all the daily rates obtaining the following 
results for year 2 (tab 6.7). The complete table till year 25 in plotted in Annex B. 
 
Year  1 2 
Inflation % 3.5 3.5 
Annual Efficiency loss % 0.8 0.8 
Production KWh 1 480 000.00 1 468 160.00 
Energy price (F1) €/KWh 0.084 0.087 
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Energy sales € 88 880.00 91 172.70 
Energy price (F2 Saturday) €/KWh 0.077 0.079 
Energy sales € 16 280.00 16 472.80 
Energy price (F3 Sunday) €/KWh 0.056 0.057 
Energy sales € 11 840.00 11 980.20 
Incentives €/KWh 0.000 0.000 
Energy sales € 0.000 0.000 
Total Revenues € 116 920.00 119 625.70 
 
Table 6.7: summarized calculation of year 1 and 2 computing the inflation and the 
annual efficiency loss 
 
The total revenues are the total €/year income net of technical loses. 
 
6.2.6 Operation Costs 
Operating costs are the expenses which are related to the operation of a 
business, or to the operation of a device, component, piece of equipment or 
facility. They are the cost of resources used by an organization just to maintain 
its existence. 
For a commercial enterprise, operating costs fall into two broad categories: 
• fixed costs, which are the same whether the operation is closed or 
running at 100% capacity. Fixed Costs include items such as the rent of 
the building. These generally have to be paid regardless of what state the 
business is in. 
• variable costs, which may increase depending on whether more 
production is done, and how it is done (producing 100 items of product 
might require 10 days of normal time or take 7 days if overtime is used. 
It may be more or less expensive to use overtime production depending 
on whether faster production means the product can be more 
profitable). Variable Costs include indirect overhead costs such as Cell 
Phone Services, Computer Supplies, Credit Card Processing, Electrical 
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use, Express Mail, Janitorial Supplies, MRO, Office Products, Payroll 
Services, Telecom, Uniforms, Utilities, or Waste Disposal etc. 
In the study case four items are defined to compute the total operating costs. Is 
fixed costs, the first, fee to municipality, in this income statement is set to zero 
as the fourth generic voice, other costs. The second voice, insurance, that 
includes all the insurance that covers the PV farm is set to 8 000 €/year and the 
ordinary maintenance of the farm to 15 000 €/year. These data are collected in 
the following table. As in the previous paragraph the values of the second year 
are affected by the inflation so the price of these services grows according to the 
inflation rate (3.5%). As for the other calculations the whole table of all the 25 
years is shown in annex B. 
 
Year   1 2 
Fee to Municipality  € 0.00 0.00 
Insurance  €/year 8 000.00 8 280.00 
Ordinary Maintenance  €/year 15 000.00 15 525.00 
Total Operating costs  €/year 23 000.00 23 805.00 
Table 6.7: Total Operating Costs of the study case. 
 
6.2.7. EBIT/EBITDA 
The Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization (EBITDA) is 
a value created by considering a company's earnings before interest payments, 
tax, depreciation, and amortization are subtracted for any final accounting of its 
income and expenses. The EBITDA of a company gives an indication of the 
current operational profitability of the business (i.e., how much profit does it 
make with its present assets and its operations on the products it produces and 
sells).  
Although EBITDA is not a financial metric recognized in generally accepted 
accounting principles, it is widely used when assessing the performance of 
companies. It is intended to allow a comparison of profitability between 
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different companies, by canceling the effects of interest payments from different 
forms of financing (by ignoring interest payments), political jurisdictions (by 
ignoring tax), collections of assets (by ignoring depreciation of assets), and 
different takeover histories (by ignoring amortization often stemming from 
goodwill). 
A negative EBITDA indicates that a business has fundamental problems with 
profitability. A positive EBITDA, on the other hand, does not necessarily mean 
that the business generates cash. This is because EBITDA ignores changes in 
Working Capital (usually needed when growing a business), capital 
expenditures (needed to replace assets that have broken down), taxes, and 
interest. 
In our study case the EBITDA is calculated as the difference between the total 
revenues and the total operative costs. 
On the other hand the EBIT is the Earnings Before Interest and Taxes and it 
refers to a measure of a firm's profit that excludes interest and income tax 
expenses [5]. It is the difference between operating revenues and operating 
expenses. When a firm does not have non-operating income, then operating 
income is sometimes used as a synonym for EBIT and operating profit. The EBIT 
is calculated by the difference between the total revenues, the total operating 
costs and the depreciation that in this case is fixed. The depreciation rate is 
9.0% of the initial CAPEX so the depreciation rate is 95 400€. 
All the results about EBITDA and EBIT are evaluated as previously explained 
and the results are shown in the following table for the first two year of the PV 
farm life. 
 
year  1 2 
CAPEX € 1 060 000.00  
Depreciation Rate % 9.0 Fixed 
Depreciation € 95 400.00 95 400.00 
Total Revenues €/year 116 920.00 119 625.70 
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Total Operating costs €/year 23 000.00 23 805.00 
EBIT € -1 480.00 420.70 
EBITDA € 93 920.00 95 820.70 
 
Table 6.8: Summarized Calculation of EBIT and EBITDA for the study case 
for the first two years of life of the farm. 
 
6.2.8 PBT 
Profit before taxes is the money retained by the firm before deducting the 
money to be paid for taxes. P.B.T. includes the money paid for interest. Thus, it 
can be calculated by subtracting the interest from EBIT (Earnings Before 
Interest and Taxes). 
PBT = EBITDA - Interest Cost 
In the study case the interest cost are the leasing installments, the calculations 
for the first two years are shown in the following table: 
 
Leasing Tenor  Year 20  
Interest Rate  % 6.5  
Amount  € 848 000.00  
Year   1 2 
Interests  € 55 120.00 53 700.30 
Capital  € 21 841.40 23 261.10 
Leasing Installments  € 76 961.40 76 961.40 
EBITDA  € 93 920.30 95 820.70 
PBT  € 16 958.60 18 859.30 
    
Table 6.9: PBT calculations for the first two years of life. 
 
6.2.9 Taxes 
Tax is a financial charge or other levy imposed upon a taxpayer (an individual or 
legal entity) by a state or the functional equivalent of a state such that failure to 
pay is punishable by law. Taxes are also imposed by many administrative 
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divisions. Taxes consist of direct or indirect taxes and may be paid in money or 
as its labor equivalent. 
In this case the IRES, Italian tax called: Imposta sul Reddito  della Società, and   
the IRAP: Imposta Regionale sulle Attività Produttive shuld be computed but no 
taxes will be charged on this kind of farm. 
 
6.2.10 Net Income  
The Net Income is an entity's income minus cost of goods sold, expenses and 
taxes for an accounting period. It is computed as the residual of all revenues and 
gains over all expenses and losses for the period, and has also been defined as 
the net increase in stockholder's equity that results from a company's 
operations. In the context of the presentation of financial statements, the IFRS 
Foundation defines net income as synonymous with profit and loss. 
In the study case according to the fact that taxes are zero the net income will be 
the same value of the PBT. 
 
Year   1 2 
Net Income  € 16 958.60 18 859.30 
    
Table 6.10: Net Income for the first two years. 
 
6.2.11 Payout and Dividends 
The payout ratio is a company's dividends paid to shareholders expressed as a 
percentage of total earnings. A higher ratio indicates that a company pays more 
in dividends and thus reinvests less of its earnings into the company. Whether 
or not this is desirable depends on the rate of growth: investors tend to prefer a 
higher plowback ratio in a slow-growing company and a lower one in a fast-
growing company. In this case the payout ratio is the 100% so all the income are 
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given in dividends to the shareholders. That means that all the net income goes 
in dividends: 
 
Year   1 2 
Dividends  € 16 958.60 18 859.30 
Table 6.11: Dividends for the first two years. 
 
6.2.12 Equity Cash Flows 
The Free Cash Flow (FCF) is a way of looking at a business's cash flow to see 
what is available for distribution among all the securities holders of a corporate 
entity. This may be useful to parties such as equity holders, debt holders, 
preferred stock holders, convertible security holders, and so on when they want 
to see how much cash can be extracted from a company without causing issues 
to its day to day operations. 
The free cash flow can be calculated in a number of different ways depending on 
audience and what accounting information is available. A common definition is 
to take the earnings before interest and taxes add any depreciation & 
Amortization then subtract any changes in working capital and capital 
expenditure. A number of refinements and adjustments may also be made to try 
and eliminate distortions depending on the audience and their intentions. 
The free cash may be different to the net income for a particular accounting 
period as the free cash flow takes into account the consumption of capital goods 
and the increases required in working capital. For example in a growing 
company with a 30 day collection period for receivables, a 30 day payment 
period for purchases, and a weekly payroll, it will require more and more 
working capital to finance its operations because of the time lag for receivables 
even though the total profits has increased. If the net income was extracted from 
the business it would cause cash flow problems for the business. 
105 
 
In the study case the equity cash flows correspond to the dividends and by this 
values it is possible to calculate the IRR, Internal Rate of Return. 
The IRR (or economic rate of return, ERR) is a rate of return used in capital 
budgeting to measure and compare the profitability of investments. It is also 
called the discounted cash flow rate of return (DCFROR). In the context of 
savings and loans the IRR is also called the effective interest rate. The term 
internal refers to the fact that its calculation does not incorporate 
environmental factors. 
The internal rate of return on an investment or project is the "annualized 
effective compounded return rate" or "rate of return" that makes the net 
present value (NPV as NET*1/(1+IRR)^year) of all cash flows (both positive and 
negative) from a particular investment equal to zero. It can also be defined as 
the discount rate at which the present value of all future cash flow is equal to 
the initial investment or in other words the rate at which an investment breaks 
even. 
IRR calculations are commonly used to evaluate the desirability of investments 
or projects. The higher a project's IRR, the more desirable it is to undertake the 
project. Assuming all projects require the same amount of up-front investment, 
the project with the highest IRR would be considered the best and undertaken 
first. 
The calculation of IRR is quite complex and needs an iterative calculation [6]. 
The evaluation of the IRR have been done with one of the functions of 
MICROSOFT EXCEL 2010 (TIR.COST) obtaining the following result: 
 
IRR % 14.7 
Table 6.12: Calculated IRR of the study case. 
 
106 
 
6.3 Income Statement Results 
An overview of all the financial quantities introduced in this chapter is given in 
one table in this paragraph, in order to have an overall view of the calculation. 
The first two years are plotted below for the entire life period refer to Annex B. 
 
Installed Capacity KWp 1000  
CAPEX € 1 060 000.00  
CAPEX per MW € 1 060,00  
Depreciation rate % 9,0%  
Producible energy per KWp KWh/KWp 1 480.00  
Total producible energy KWh 1 480.000.00  
     
Leasing Tenor year 20  
Interest Rate % 6,5  
Leverage % 80  
Amount € 848 000.00  
    
     
IRES % 0  
IRAP % 0  
Deductiblefinancial expenses/EBITDA % 30  
ICI  € Kwp 0,0  
     
Year  1 2 
     
Inflation % 3,5 3,5 
     
Production KWh 1 480 000 1 468 160 
 Annual efficiency loss % 0,8 0,8 
Self-consumption KWh 0,0 0,0 
Electricity inlet into the network KWh 1 480 000 1 468 160 
     
 Energy Price (F1) €/KWh 0.084 0.087 
 Energy sales € 88 800.0 91 172.70 
     
 Energy Price (F2 Saturday) €/KWh 0.077 0.079 
 Energy sales € 16 280.0 16 472.8 
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 Energy Price (F3 Sunday) €/KWh 0.056 0.057 
 Energy sales € 11 840.0 11 980.2 
     
 Incentives (White Certificates) €/KWh 0.000 0.000 
 Incentives € 0,0 0,0 
     
Total revenues € 116 920.0 119 625.7 
     
 Fee to municipality € 0.0 0.0 
 Insurance € 8 000.0 8 280.0 
 Ordinary maintenance € 15 000.0 15 525.0 
 Other costs € 0.0 0.0 
Total operating costs € 23 000.0 23 805.0 
       
EBITDA € 93 920.0 95 820.7 
     
 Depreciation € 95 400.0  95 400.0 
EBIT € 1 480.0 420.7 
     
EBIT gross of depreciation € 93 920.0 95 820.7 
     
 Interests € 55 120.0 53 700.3 
 Capital € 21 841.4 23 261.1 
Leasing installments € 76 961.4  76 961.4 
     
PBT € 16 958.6 18 859.3 
     
 Deductible financial expenses € 28 176.0 28 746.2 
 Taxable Income for IRES € 43 902.6 43 813.4 
 IRES € 0.0 0.0 
 Taxable Income for IRAP € 72 078.6 72 559.,6 
 IRAP € 0.0 0.0 
 Other taxes € 0.0 0.0 
Total Taxes € 0,0 0,0 
       
Net Income € 16 958.6 18 859.3 
     
Pay-out % 100 100 
Dividends € 16 958.6 18 859.3 
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Equity Cash Flows 212 000.0 16 958.6 18 859.3 
     
IRR 14,7%   
 
Table 6.13: Overall overview of the income statement for the first two years of the PV farm 
analyzed in this study case. 
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